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HOUSING CODES, BUILDING DEMOLITION, AND 
JUST COMPENSATION: A RATIONALE FOR 
THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC POWERS 
OVER SLUM HOUSING 
Daniel R. Afandelker* 
IN programs of housing
1 improvement and slum clearance, public 
agencies2 must often make difficult choices between the exercise 
of public powers of land acquisition, which require the payment of 
compensation, and public powers of noncompensatory regulation, 
which require no payment of compensation.3 This Article focuses on 
three of these programs-building demolition, urban renewal, and 
housing code enforcement. Public agencies may demolish slum 
dwellings, one at a time, without compensation. Title to the cleared 
site is not affected and remains in the owner after the building has 
been demolished. Under statutory powers of urban renewal, local 
public agencies may designate entire slum neighborhoods as urban 
renewal project areas. Within these project areas, slum dwell-
• Visiting Professor of Urban Planning and Political Science, University of Washing-
ton (1968-1969); Professor of Law, Washington University (St. Louis). B.A. 1947, LL.B. 
1949, University of Wisconsin; J .S.D. 1956, Yale University.-Ed. 
Research on this Article was supported in part by a grant from the United States 
Public Health Service to the author, Contract No. PH-86-66-177. The opinions expressed 
in this Article are entirely those of the author and do not in any way represent the 
views of the United States Public Health Service. The author was greatly assisted in 
the preparation of this Article by Mr. Thomas Geiger and Mr. Robert Washburn, 
research associates in the Washington University School of Law (St. Louis). 
I. While this Article concentrates on housing, it is not suggested that similar prob-
lems do not arise in connection with the valuation of substandard nonresidential prop-
erty. What distinguishes the slum housing problem is the availability of a wide range 
of federal subsidies and federally assisted local programs which are directed toward 
housing improvement. These programs and subsidies have drastically affected the private 
market for slum housing and the character of local controls over substandard housing 
conditions. For example, local maintenance codes for nonresidential property are not 
common, but local codes for housing maintenance are required as a condition of eligibil-
ity for federal assistance in housing programs. See the discussion in text accompanying 
note 7 infra. 
2. Problems of coordination at the local level often develop in the exercise of these 
powers because they have been conferred on different public agencies. A simple discus• 
sion of the programs included in this Article will emphasize this problem. Urban 
renewal powers may be exercised directly by municipalities but are usually conferred 
on an independent housing or urban renewal authority. Housing codes are enacted by 
municipal ordinance and enforced by a separate municipal agency. Demolition powers 
are also exercised by a municipal agency independent of the urban renewal authority. 
Counties seldom enact housing codes, but in some states they have been given powers of 
building demolition. State fire marshals or similar agencies have powers of demolition 
in about half the states. Moreover, demolition powers conferred on state agencies may 
be exercised in urban areas. 
3. These problems have also been acute in programs for open-space control and 
preservation. For a summary, see Satterthwaite &: Marcou, Open space, Recreation, and 
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ings and the land on which they stand may be acquired for clearance 
or rehabilitation, but compensation must be paid. Finally, local 
governments may enact housing codes which impose minimum 
standards for housing maintenance, space and occupancy, and health 
and sanitary facilities. Without payment of compensation, the hous-
ing code enforcement agency may issue compulsory orders of repair 
which require the slum owner to bring his dwelling into compliance 
with the housing code on pain of suffering criminal and perhaps 
civil penalties. The dwelling may also be closed to occupancy by 
public order until it has been brought into compliance with hous-
ing code standards. 
Until recently, tension did not develop between these potentially 
overlapping powers. While the public authority to demolish slum 
dwellings without compensation has its historic antecedents in nine-
teenth-century powers to abate public nuisances, the rate of indi-
vidual building demolitions in American municipalities has been 
slow.4 It has now accelerated with the enactment of a federal pro-
gram of financial assistance to municipalities to meet demolition 
costs.5 Housing codes date back to the housing reform movement 
that originated in New York at the turn of the century,8 but they 
were not common until relatively recent years. Because of the im-
petus of federal requirements for urban renewal and related finan-
cial assistance,7 housing codes have now been widely adopted.8 
Enforcement of housing codes, which also suffered because of finan-
cial stringencies at the local level, has increased under another pro-
gram of federal aid9 permitting code enforcement in selected neigh-
Conservation, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING 185, 199-207 (1968). The 
author has also discussed the use of compensatory and noncompensatory controls in 
the context of public control of land use. Mandelker, Planning the Freeway: Interim 
_ Controls in Highway Programs, 1964 DuKE L.J. 439; Mandelker, What Open Space1 
Where? How?, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING 21 (1963). See 
Mandelker, Notes From the English: Compensation in Town and Country Planning, 
49 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 699 (1961). 
4. Conversations with local officials in St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri, and else• 
Where? How?, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING 21 (1963). See 
demolition and to undertake the necessary legal proceedings. This problem has now 
been remedied in part by the federal program of demolition assistance discussed in 
text accompanying note 5 infra. 
5. Housing Act of 1949, § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 1467 (Supp. 1967). 
6. L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING chs. 1-3 (1968). 
7. Housing Act of 1949, § IOI(c), 42 U.S.C. § 145l(c) (Supp. 1967). 
8. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. R.Ev. 801, 803 (1965); 
Comment, Conservation and Rehabilitation of Housing: An Idea Approaches Adoles• 
cence, 63 MICH. L. R.Ev. 892, 894, 895 (1965) (reporting survey of cities undertaking 
rehabilitation projects). 
9. Housing Act of 1949, § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 1468 (Supp. 1967). 
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borhoods which are similar to urban renewal project areas.10 Ex-
tensive local activity in slum clearance and urban renewal dates 
from the enactment of the slum clearance title in the federal Hous-
ing Act of 1949.11 In addition, renewal-based activities directed at 
housing improvement have expanded with the enactment of the fed-
eral Model Cities legislation in 196612 and the extension of the 
federal urban renewal program to permit unlimited acquisition of 
slum housing for purposes of rehabilitation in 1968.13 
Because the statutes and the decisional law do not clearly distin-
guish the legal bases for these related but different programs, we 
can expect conflicts among them to intensify. For example, prac-
tically the identical language which defines buildings subject to 
demolition under demolition laws also defines slum and blighted 
dwellings which qualify for inclusion in project areas under urban 
renewal legislation.14 Housing codes typically define minimum con-
ditions of repair and occupancy rather than blight, but these 
definitions can be applied to buildings which would qualify, in the 
alternative, for demolition without compensation or for acquisition 
with compensation in urban renewal. Whether a slum dwelling is 
ordered to be repaired under a housing code, demolished without 
compensation, or acquired as part of an urban renewal program after 
compensation has been paid may well depend upon how the munici-
pality chooses to exercise its slum housing powers.15 
Many problems arise from the potential overlapping application 
10. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CODE ENFORCEMENT 
GRANT HANDBOOK 5-6 (1968). Demolition grants arc also made for demolition "on a 
planned neighborhood basis." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 
DEMOLITION GRANT HANDBOOK 6 (1968). 
II. Housing Act of 1949, tit. I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-65 (1964). 
12. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, tit. I, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3301-13 (Supp. 1967). This program contemplates the extension of renewal 
activities to entire city neighborhoods which are larger tban conventional urban 
renewal project areas. 
13. Housing Act of 1949, § II0(c)(8), as amended, Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 476, § 504. 
14. Thus, tbe draft slum clearance bill prepared by tbe U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development defines a "slum" area as 
an area in which tbere is a predominance of buildings ••• which by reason of 
dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation, 
light, air, sanitation, or open spaces, high density of population or overcrowding, 
or the existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other 
causes ••• is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or welfare. 
Office of General Counsel, [U.S.] Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Draft Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal Bill § 19(h) (Nov. 19, 1965). Cf. tbe language 
of state statutes authorizing building demolition without compensation, discussed in 
text accompanying notes 26-47 infra. 
15. This statement must be qualified to the extent tbat a property owner who claims 
tbat his building was improperly demolished without compensation may bring an action 
by way of inverse compensation to claim his damages. McMahon v. City of Telluride, 
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of these three techniques. One is the problem of equity.to Uncle 
Jim may be ordered to repair his house with his mm resources, 
while Aunt Jane may not only be paid full compensation for her 
home as part of an urban renewal project, but may also be reim-
bursed for the cost of finding new housing.t7 The mutually exclusive 
character of these programs creates difficulties on the public side 
of the process as well. Housing code enforcement is solely a local reg-
ulatory power over housing; it is never accompanied by the payment 
of compensation. Although housing codes have usually been held 
constitutional,t8 the courts have left open the possibility that the 
repairs and alterations required by a code enforcement agency may 
be so burdensome that they amount to an unconstitutional taking.to 
In this event, the alternative is likely to be no housing code enforce-
ment at all. Under building demolition legislation, however, a find-
ing is made that the structure either is or is not subject to demoli-
tion without compensation; a finding that the building has some 
value-and therefore is subject to demolition on payment of some 
compensation-is not possible. On the other hand, compensation at 
market values must be paid in urban renewal project areas, and 
reformers have argued that the law of just compensation does not 
take adequate account of the substandard condition of slum prop-
erty.20 As a result, they contend, eminent domain awards are exces-
79 Colo. 281, 244 P. 1017 (1926), noted, 46 A.L.R. 363 (1927). But such a cause of 
action must be based on an improper exercise of the building demolition power, not 
on the argument that the property should have been included in an urban renewal so 
that compensation could have been paid. 
16. In some cities, extensive building demolitions under the demolition ordinance 
have preceded later acquisition of the cleared sites for urban renewal purposes, with 
the result that costs of acquisition have been substantially reduced. The use of this 
strategy in Detroit, Michigan, was reported to the author. Apparently this helped to 
produce the unfavorable judicial reaction in City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 
136 N.W.2d 896 (1965), discussed in text accompanying note 165 infra. Federal regula-
tions for the federal demolition grant program indicate that federal assistance is 
available for demolition "in an urban renewal project area for which survey and 
planning activities are being carried out." DEMOLITION GRANT HANDBOOK, supra note 
10, at 6. 
17. This problem has been partially alleviated by a program of individual federal 
grants for property rehabilitation, up to a ceiling of $3,000. Housing Act of 1949, § 115, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1452(b), 1465 (1964), as amended, Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 476, § 503. 
But federal grants are obviously not a complete solution. 
18. E.g., Apple v. City and County of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P .2d 91 (1964); Note, 
Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1115 (1956). 
19. See Kaukas v. City of Chicago, 27 Ill. 2d 197, 188 N.E.2d 700, appeal dismissed, 
375 U.S. 8 (1963). See also Sawyer v. Robbins, 213 S.2d 515 (Fla. App. 1968), holding 
that a violation of a local housing code is not necessarily an enjoinable nuisance in a 
case in which the defect alleged was a failure to provide hot water facilities. 
20. The cry is not a new one. For a sampling of the literature, see PRESIDENT'S CON· 
FERENCE ON Hor.rn BUILDING AND Hor-rn OWNERSHIP: SLUMS, LARGE-SCALE HOUSING AND 
DECENTRALIZATION 107 (1932); Dagen &: Cody, Property, Et Al. v. Nuisance, Et Al., 26 
LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 70 (1961); Johnson, Rehabilitation Feasibility Studies in Fed-
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sive, mrners of substandard dwellings are overcompensated, and the 
cost of new or rehabilitated housing is increased. These disparities 
between the compliance and compensation burdens are aggravated 
by the fact that, even though land reassembly is often required in 
housing improvement programs, title to the land may be taken by 
a public agency only in urban renewal. 
This Article will attempt to reconcile the exercise of public 
powers over slum housing by proposing a basis for compensation that 
is applicable no matter what program treatment is selected. While 
not minimizing the difficult problems of land valuation in slum 
areas, the Article will focus on the problem of compensation for 
substandard slum dwellings. It will propose a sliding scale of com-
pensation-one that permits a range of compensatory payments 
which are related to compliance with housing code requirements. 
Standardizing the basis for compensation will not only remove 
present inequities in program application; it will also permit a 
choice of the appropriate program treatment without the present 
concern that different programs visit widely disparate burdens on 
both property mrners and public agencies. The discussion will begin 
with an analysis of the law of building demolition. Since judging a 
building suitable for demolition is a determination-in constitu-
tional terms-that the structure has no value at all, the law of 
demolition should at least provide a starting point for constructing 
a standard measure of the compensatory interest in slum housing. 
I. DEMOLITION OF SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS 
A. Legal Basis for Demolition 
Legal authority for demolition of substandard buildings is found 
in a bewildering array of powers which can be understood only in 
light of their historical development. The authority to demolish 
substandard structures had its origins in the common-law power21 
of municipalities to demolish buildings as public nuisances. 0£ 
erally-.1.ssisted Areas, 34 APPRAISAL J. 183, 188 (1966); Levi, Focal Leverage Points in 
Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 275 (1966). 
21. The existence of this power at common law appears to be an exception to the 
usual rule that municipalities have only those powers which are conferred by statute or 
home-rule constitutional provisions, as implemented through charter or local ordinance. 
D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 220, 221 (1966). The answer appears 
to lie in the fact that the power to demolish substandard buildings is merely an instance 
of equity jurisdiction, not dependent on statute, which municipalities invoke through 
appropriate court proceedings. For a modem example of the exercise of common-law 
powers of building demolition, see Takata v. City of Los Angeles, 184 Cal. App. 2d 174, 
7 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1960) (avoiding challenge to retroactive application of ordinance). 
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course, the "common-law" adjective is not entirely accurate, as the 
power to order demolition was actually established in equity. These 
equity origins are critical, for the way in which equity shaped the 
power to order demolition still affects the constitutional basis of 
demolition law. 
Early state statutes, local home rule charters, and local ordi-
nances ratified the common-law power to demolish buildings by 
simply conferring the power to abate nuisances. Building demoli-
tions still occur under these provisions.22 More complex legislation 
directed solely to the demolition problem followed, either in local 
building 23 and housing 24 codes or in state statutes.25 These statutes 
fall into two groups.26 
One type, based on a model law drafted near the turn of the 
century,27 authorizes state fire marshals and similar local agencies to 
22. California and Florida do not have specific statutory authority for demolition of 
substandard buildings. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 167 .05 (1966), authorizing municipali-
ties to abate nuisances. The Florida court at one time suggested this provision as an 
alternative to slum clearance under eminent domain. Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 
S.2d 663 (Fla. 1952). In City of Bakersfield v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 93, 410 P.2d 303 (1966), 
the court held that the state statute authorizing municipal abatement of nuisances 
conferred power on municipalities to adopt by reference a uniform building code con-
taining provisions permitting the demolition of unsafe buildings. However, state 
enabling legislation for substandard building demolition need not always be imple• 
mented by local ordinance. Fairfield v. Wolter, IO Wis. 2d 521, 103 N.W .2d 52!1 (1960). 
23. E.g., INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF Bun.DING OFFICIALS, UNIFORM Burl.DING CODE, 
VOLUME IV: DANGEROUS BUILDINGS (1967). Uniform model building codes, published by 
various national organizations of national and related officials, have been available since 
1905. ADVISORY COMl\USSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BUII.DING CODES: A 
PROGRAM FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 71 (1966). For a survey of building code 
adoptions in the Puget Sound area of the State of 'Washington, see Puget Sound Govern-
mental Conference, A Survey of Building Codes (April 1967). In contrast to the 
housing code, the building code establishes standards for new construction. 
24. As part of this study, a survey of the housing codes of several major cities was 
conducted to determine whether the codes contained demolition provisions. For one 
suclr provision, see Cleveland Codified Ordinances § 6.1305(c) (1960). For an application 
of this provision, and a similar provision in the local building code, see State ex rel. 
Sclrulman v. City of Cleveland, 8 Ohio Misc. 1,220 N.E.2d 386 (1966). 
25. State attention to the demolition problem has been episodic. The earliest legis-
lation dates from the tum of the century, when the housing reform movement origi-
nated. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 68-72, discussing a model tenement demolition 
law drafted in the state of New York in that period. Legislative activity also picked up 
during the depression of the 1930's, and in recent years under the spur of the federal 
housing program. 
26. Some of the legislation to be discussed applies only to dwellings, while some is 
of more general application and applies to any building or structure. The state fire 
marshal laws, discussed at notes 27-28 infra and accompanying text, arc in the second 
category. The federal eligibility requirements for demolition assistance grants should 
be compared with the state legislation authorizing demolition of substandard buildings. 
Federal regulations require that "[t]he structures to be demolished must constitute a 
public nuisance and a serious hazard to the public health and welfare." DEMounoN 
GRANT HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 1. 
27. It has been suggested that a provision for the demolition of unsafe buildings first 
appeared in a model state fire marshal act drafted around 1916 by the Fire Marshals' 
Association of North America. Letter from Robert ,v. Grant, Executive Secretary, Fire 
Marshals' Assn. of North America to the author, Aug. 20, 1968. 
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demolish buildings in order to eliminate fire hazards. The model 
law on which these statutes are based authorizes the demolition of 
any building which "for want of repairs, lack of or insufficient fire 
escapes, automatic or other fire alarm apparatus or fire extinguishing 
equipment, or by reason of age or dilapidated condition, or from 
any other cause, is especially liable to fire, and which is so situated 
as to endanger other property .... "28 Laws of this type are found 
in about half the states. While the authority to demolish buildings 
under these statutes is lodged primarily in the state fire marshal, 
in some states it has been extended to local fire departments or fire 
chiefs, or to other local officers.29 
28. Fire Marshals' Assn. of North America, Suggested State Fire Marshal Law § 7 
(mimeo, undated). Several of the fire hazard demolition laws substantially follow this 
model. ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 39 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 633.081 (Supp. 1968); HAWAII 
R.Ev. LAws § I84-7(e) (1955); IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-807 (1964); KY. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 227.380 
(Supp. 1968), 227.390 (1966); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 40:1575 (1965); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. 
ANN. § 153:14(!!) (1955); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-2417 (1966). Kentucky and Hawaii omit 
a reference to fire apparatus and equipment. Louisiana adds a reference to ingress and 
egress. Kentucky permits demolition only when repair is not feasible. 
To the clause of the model act authorizing demolition for lack of sufficient fire 
escapes, apparatus, and equipment, the Michigan law adds a second clause authorizing 
demolition whenever the building contains "defective electrical wiring or electrical 
equipment, defective chimneys, defective gas connections, defective heating apparatus." 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 29.8 (1967). Several statutes include only the second Michigan 
clause and omit the clause of the model act authorizing demolition for lack of fire 
escapes or other fire apparatus. Otherwise, these laws follow the model act. MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 73.09 (1968); MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 82-1219 (1966); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-513 
(1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 18-01-14 (1960); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 3737.01 (Page Supp. 
1967); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-426 (1959), or a model ordinance based on the Michigan 
version of the fire marshal law, but recommended for adoption as a general building 
demolition ordinance, see League of Oregon Cities, Abatement of Building Nuisances, 
Legal Bull. No. I, at 4 (1936). 
Still other laws omit both the fire escape and apparatus clause of the model act and 
the second Michigan clause. Otherwise, they substantially follow the model act. GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 92A-724 to 726 (1958); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 100.13 (Supp. 1968), 100.27 
(1949); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2393 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 38A, § 9(b) (1964) 
(adds abandoned condition); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 317 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
35, § 1183(a) (1964); W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 29-3-4a (1966). South Dakota authorizes demoli-
tion of "unusually hazardous or dangerous" buildings which are liable "to cause fire or 
explosion." S.D. CoDE § 31.0305 (Supp. 1960). 
The model law uses a series of cumulative causes and is not a model of clarity. 
After a reference to buildings with the indicated substandard conditions, it then pro-
vides that the state fire marshal or his deputies "shall order the same to be removed 
or remedied." Some of the adopted statutes more explicitly authorize demolition. The 
model law, and some of the state statutes, also refer in the same section to inflammable 
and combustible conditions in buildings, and similarly authorize that they be removed 
or remedied. It is doubtful, however, whether the presence of inflammable or com-
bustible material would warrant demolition. The court would probably order abatement 
of the dangerous use. See Albert v. City of Mountain Home, 81 Idaho 74, 337 P .2d 377 
(1959), and the discussion in text accompanying notes 61-63 infra. 
29. See, e.g., the Oklahoma and South Dakota laws, supra note 28. In urban areas, 
intensive campaigns have sometimes been waged under the authority of these statutes. 
For discussion of the demolition program of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in the years from 
1928 to 1948, see Lewis, Condemnation of Dilapidated Buildings, THE MUNICIPALITY, 
Feb. 1948, at 31. On the Portland, Oregon, program during the same period, see Letter 
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A second kind of statute, found in practically all the states, 
authorizes local government units to demolish dangerous, unsafe, 
or unfit buildings; of course, the language of the statutes in this 
group varies considerably in scope and complexity.30 Many of the 
demolition statutes explicitly authorize demolition as an alternative 
to repair-a limitation on the power to demolish which is also re-
flected in some judicial decisions.31 This second group of demolition 
statutes does not restrict building demolition to situations in which 
there is a finding of fire hazard, although fire hazard may appear 
as one of the grounds on which demolition can be ordered. Statutes 
in nine states authorize building demolition for a variety of substan-
dard conditions, all of which contribute to a finding that the build-
ing is "unfit" for human habitation. The Alaska statute is typical. It 
authorizes demolition 
[w]hen a municipality finds that a dwelling exists which is unfit for 
human habitation due to dilapidation, defects increasing the hazard 
of fire, accident or other calamity, lack of ventilation, light or sani-
tary facilities, or any other condition [including those set out later 
in the statute] ... which makes the dwelling unsafe or insanitary, 
or dangerous or detrimental to the health, safety or morals, or other-
wise inimical to the residents of the municipality .... 32 
A later provision in this statute lists additional conditions which 
may lead to a finding of unfitness, such as "blighting" factors, over-
from Fred W. Roberts, Fire Marshal, Portland, Oregon, to Arthur S. Harris, Boston 
Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 14, 1940. (A copy is on file with the Michigan Law Review.) 
30. For the most part, statutory language using one or more of the typical phrases 
to describe a building subject to demolition has been upheld as providing a standard 
definite enough to avoid delegation of power objections. Keyes v. Madsen, 179 F.2d 40 
(D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 928 (1950); Springfield v. Little Rock, 226 Ark. 
462, 290 S.W.2d 620 (1956); Moll Co. v. Holstner, 252 Ky. 249, 67 S.W.2d 1 (19!!4); Lyons 
v. Prince, 281 N.Y. 557, 24 N.E.2d 466 (1939); State ex rel. Schulman v. City of Cleveland, 
8 Ohio Misc. I, 220 N.E.2d 386 (1966); Eno v. City of Burlington, 125 Vt. 8, 209 A.2d 
499 (1965); cf. Petrushansky v. State, 182 Md. 164, 32 A.2d 696 (1943). Statutes authorizing 
demolition of buildings constituting fire hazards have also been sustained against delega• 
tion of power objections. American Home Fire Assur. Co. v. Mid-West Enterprise Co., 
189 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1951). 
In some cases in which standards have been declared inadequate, the ordinance 
language appears to be properly open to objection. City of Evansville v. Miller, 146 
Ind. 613, 45 N.E. 1054 (1897) (building partially destroyed by fire); Lux v. Milwaukee 
Mechanics Ins. Co., 322 Mo. 342, 15 S.W.2d 343 (1929) (discretionary power of building 
official not limited). On the other hand, a few cases, some of them modem, have found 
unconstitutional delegations of power in the face of fairly specific legislative language. 
People ex rel. Gamber v. Sholem, 294 III. 204, 128 N.E. 377 (1920); City of Saginaw v. 
Budd, 381 Mich. 173, 160 N.W.2d 906 (1968); Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 
S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955); Jones v. Logan City Corp., 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160 
(1967). These cases are difficult to square with judicial acceptance of similar standards 
in zoning cases. Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administra-
tion, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 60. 
31. See text accompanying notes 67-73 infra. 
32 . .AI.AsKA STAT. § 18.55.750 (1962). 
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crowding, and "any violation of health, fire, building or zoning 
regulations, or any other laws or regulations, relating to the use of 
land and the use and occupancy of buildings and improvements."33 
Note that some of these conditions may relate to characteristics 
which are not necessarily structural. Additional standards on which 
to base a finding of unfitness may be provided by local ordinance.34 
Finally, demolition may not be authorized under the Alaska act if 
a dwelling can be repaired at "a reasonable cost in relation to its 
value,"35 and local ordinances must fix a repair ratio to be used in 
determining whether repair is reasonable.36 Other statutes modeled 
on the Alaska law follow its general format but omit some of the 
conditions on which a demolition order may be rested.37 
To be compared with laws enacted on the Alaska model are the 
statutes which simply select one generic term-such as buildings 
which are "dangerous to life or health,"38 unsafe,39 or in some other 
33. ALASKA STAT. § 18.55.860 (1962). The provision authorizes a determination 
that a dwelling is unfit for human habitation if ••• conditions exist which are 
dangerous or injurious to the health, safety or morals of the occupant of the dwell-
ing, the occupants of neighboring dwellings or other residents of the municipality, 
or which have a blighting influence on properties in the area. These conditions may 
include the following without limitation: defects increasing the hazards of fire, 
accident, or other calamity; lack of adequate ventilation, light or sanitary facilities; 
dilapidation; disrepair; structural defects; uncleanliness; overcrowding; inadequate 
ingress and egress; inadequate drainage; or any violation of health, fire, building 
or zoning regulations, or any other laws or regulations, relating to the use of land 
and the use and occupancy of buildings and improvements. 
34. ALASKA STAT. § 18.55.860 (1962). 
35. ALASKA STAT, § 18.55.810 (1962). A finding of unfitness can lead either to an order 
for demolition or repair, or to an order that the building be closed to occupancy until 
repairs are made. 
36. ALASKA STAT. § 18.55.820 (1962). 
37. The Hawaii statute is identical to the Alaska law. HAWAII REv. LAws § 143-60 
(1955). All of the other statutes contain the primary conditions used to determine unfit-
ness which appear in the Alaska statute, and which are quoted in the text accompanying 
note 32. However, New Hampshire and Washington omit the reference to unsafe build-
ings. The difference in the other statutes is that they all omit some of the secondary 
conditions leading to a finding of unfitness which are included in the Alaska statute 
quoted in note 33 supra. The statutes are listed below, with the omissions from the 
Alaska provision indicated. KY. REv. STAT. §§ 80.630, 80.680 (1966) (omits overcrowding, 
ingress and egress, drainage, and violation of laws); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 48A: 2, 6, 7 
(Supp. 1967) (omits blighting influence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2.3 (1967) (omits all 
secondary conditions and ordinance authority to state additional conditions); S.C. CODE 
ANN. §§ 36-502, 36-503(3), 36-505 (1962) (like Kentucky, but also omits blighting influ-
ences); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1202, 13-1203(c), 13-1204 (1955) (like South Carolina); 
WASH, REv. CODE § 35.80.030(d)(e) (Supp. 1967) (omits blighting influence, egress and 
ingress, violation of laws); W. VA. CODE .ANN. § 8-4-lOa (1966) (like New Jersey). 
Kentucky, New Jersey, and '\Vest Virginia omit the reasonable-cost test as the basis 
for ordering demolition, and '\Vashington permits a demolition order to be based, in 
the alternative, on the degree of structural deterioration. New Hampshire includes the 
reasonable-cost test but does not permit specification of the ratio of repair in local 
ordinances. 
38. CONN, GEN. STAT. § 19-344 (1960); IOWA CODE ANN, § 413.80 (1949); LA. REv. STAT, 
ANN. § 33:4752 (1966) (cities over 100,000); N.Y. MuLT, DWELL. LAw § 309(lb) (Supp. 
1968). See also TEX. REv. C1v. STAT, art. 1015(24) (1963) (dangerous and liable to fall); 
WYO, STAT. ANN. § 15.1-3(24) (1965) (dangerous). 
39. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-501 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3111 (1959). 
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comparable condition40-to describe buildings subject to demoli-
tion. In about half the states, somewhat more complex statutes may 
contain as many as six or seven conditions which can justify the 
demolition of a dwelling.41 Dwellings which are either "dangerous" 
40. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-2708 (1949) (unfit for human habitation, health agencies); 
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 715.26 (Page 1954) (insecure); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1067 
(1963) (dilapidated). See also R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 45-2402(3)(9b) (Supp. 1967), which 
simply uses a reasonable-cost-of-repair standard as the basis for authorizing demolition. 
Other statutes authorize the demolition of buildings which are either dangerous or 
unsafe. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, § 429.8 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1967) (counties); Kan. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. § 12-1752 (1965); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 130(16) (1965); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW 
§ 89(7-a) (1951). 
41. Citations to the statutes follow. As there are minor variations in phraseology 
in these laws, the phrase used to describe the substandard building condition selected 
by the statute to justify demolition does not always correspond to the exact statutory 
authorization. For example, some of the statutes permit the demolition of buildings 
which menace the public health or safety-a ground for demolition which is taken as 
the equivalent of an authorization to demolish "dangerous" buildings. The substantive 
effect of the statutory substandard conditions varies. Usually the indicated conditions 
are available as alternative grounds for demolition. Other statutes simply authorize the 
demolition of buildings which are nuisances or which are injurious or detrimental to 
the health or general welfare, and then provide a variety of substandard conditions 
which can provide the basis for such a finding. 
For example, one type of statute authorizes the demolition of buildings which are 
either dangerous or unsafe, and then includes additional grounds for demolition. These 
additional grounds are indicated for each statute following the citation: ILL. ANN. STAT. 
ch. 24, § 11-31-1 (Supp. 1967) (incomplete, abandoned); IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6144 (Supp. 
1968) (insanitary, fire hazard, violation of law); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2851 
(Supp. 1968) (unstable, insanitary, fire hazard, unsuitable for use, inadequate main-
tenance, dilapidation, obsolescence, abandonment); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.05(l)(a) (1965) 
(old, dilapidated, out of repair, insanitary, unfit, unreasonable to repair). The Wisconsin 
law also provides that repairs will be presumed unreasonable whenever the cost of 
repairs exceeds fifty per cent of the assessed value of the building. WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 66.05(l)(b) (1965). 
Another type of statute authorizes the demolition of buildings that are dangerous, 
and then includes additional grounds for demolition. These additional grounds are 
indicated for each statute following its citation: D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-622 (1967) 
(insanitary); GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1118 (1967) (unfit); IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-1407(24) 
(1963) (insecure, violation of law); !DAHO CoDE ANN. § 50-335 (1967) (dilapidated, fire 
hazard); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4761 (1966) (dilapidated); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. 
ch. 139, § 1 (Supp. 1968), ch. 139, § 3 (1958) (burnt, dilapidated); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. 
ch. 143, § 9 (Supp. 1968) (abandoned); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. Ill,§ 127B (Supp. 1968) 
(noncompliance with state sanitary code); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 5.2843, 5.2858 5.2873(1) 
(1967) (disrepair); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 463.15(3) (Supp. 1968) (inadequate maintenance, 
dilapidation, physical damage, insanitary, abandonment, fire hazard); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 3374-149 (1956) (insecure); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 155-B:1, 155-B:2 (Supp. 1967) (in-
adequate maintenance, dilapidation, physical damage, insanitary, abandonment, fire 
hazard); N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw § 309(2) (1946) (abandoned, fire hazard); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 40-05-02(24) (1968) (like Idaho); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 14611 (Supp. 1967) 
(hazardous, structurally unsound, unfit, violation of law-first class cities); TEX. REv. 
Cxv. STAT. art. 1175(25) (1963) (like Idaho-home rule cities); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-52 
(1962) (violation of law). 
Two statutes authorize the demolition of unsafe buildings, and include additional 
grounds for demolition. These additional grounds are indicated for each statute follow-
ing its citation: .ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2803 (1956) (dilapidated, unsightly, insanitary, 
obnoxious, detrimental to public welfare); NEV. REv. STAT. § 266.335(3) (1967) (insecure). 
A final type of statute makes no reference to dangerous or unsafe conditions, but 
includes a variety of other conditions as the basis for demolition. These conditions are 
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or "dangerous to life or health" may be demolished under most of 
these statutes; many of them also authorize the demolition of "un-
safe," "dilapidated," "insanitary," or "unfit" dwellings. A few, like 
the Alaska statute, depart from a purely structural basis for demoli-
tion and authorize demolition whenever conditions such as age, 
abandonment, or obsolescence justify it.42 
Model demolition ordinances drafted by national code-drafting 
agencies43 usually follow one or another of the statutory patterns out-
lined above, and their provisions are also reflected in local ordi-
nances. 44 One exception is the demolition provision found in the 
Uniform Building Code.45 It lists seventeen "conditions or defects" 
which will lead to a finding that a building is so "dangerous" that 
it is subject to demolition.46 Many of these conditions or defects 
echo the more general language of the state statutes, but some are 
indicated for each statute following its citation: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-17-4(A) (Supp. 
1967) (ruined, damaged, dilapidated); N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw § 309(la) (Supp. 1968) 
(overcrowded; inadequate access; insufficient for its use); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.05(8)(a)(b) 
(1965) (deteriorated, dilapidated, blighted, and vandalized). The Wisconsin statute also 
authorizes demolition whenever a building with the indicated substandard conditions 
"offends the aesthetic character of the immediate neighborhood or produces blight." 
42. ALASKA STAT. § 18.55.680 (1962). 
43. Most of these provisions have been drafted as part of suggested model building 
codes. BUILDING OFFICIALS CONFERENCE OF AMERICA, BASIC BUILDING CODE § 125.1 (4th 
ed. 1965) refers to "[a]ll buildings or structures that are or hereafter shall become unsafe, 
unsanitary, or deficient in adequate exit facilities, or which constitute a fire hazard, 
or arc otherwise dangerous to human life or the public welfare, or which by reason of 
illegal or improper use, occupancy or maintenance •••• " Vacant and unguarded build-
ings are also "deemed" unsafe. AMERICAN !Ns. AssN., NATIONAL BUILDING CODE § 104.1 
(1967 ed.) refers to buildings and structures "deemed structurally unsafe; unstable; un-
sanitary, inadequately provided with exit facilities; constituting a fire hazard; unsuitable 
or improper for the use of [or?] occupancy to which they are put; constituting a 
hazard of health or safety because of inadequate maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence 
or abandonment; or otherwise dangerous to life or property." The code also applies to 
"(v]acant buildings ••• deemed to constitute a hazard." See also SOUTHERN BUILDING 
CODE CONGRESS, SOUTIIERN STANDARD BUILDING CODE § 103.4 (undated) (similar). 
A model demolition provision is also included in a recently proposed model housing 
code. AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH AssN.-[U.S.] PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, RECOMMENDED 
HOUSING l\lAINT.ENAl,CE AND OCCUPANCY ORDINANCE § 16.02.01 (rev. ed., 1967): "Any 
dwelling [is] ••• unfit for human habitation when, in the judgment of the (appropriate 
authority) it is so damaged, decayed, dilapidated, insanitary, unsafe or vermin-infested 
as to created [sic] a hazard to the health, safety and welfare of the occupants or of the 
public, and where the structure is determined by the (Appropriate Authority) not to 
warrant repair • • •• " The code also authorizes demolition of any vacant building 
declared by the appropriate authority to be "detrimental to the public health, safety 
or welfare." Id. § 16.02.02. 
44. E.g., Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 11339, Jan. 24, 1966, amending DALLAS, T:Ex., REv. 
CODE § 27-38 (1960); Denver, Colo., Ordinance 170, June 13, 1955; Detroit, Mich., 
Ordinance 676-F, Feb. 27, 1962; Miami, Fla., Ordinance 6908, July 25, 1961; New 
Orleans, La., Ordinance 18,584, Jan. IO, 1963. 
45. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BUILDING OFFICIALS, UNIFORM: BUILDING 'CODE, 
VOLUME IV: DANGEROUS BUILDINGS (1967 ed.), 
46. Id. § 302. 
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more specific. For example, one of the conditions which will justify 
demolition is a "stress in any materials ... more than one and one-
half times the ... stress allowed" in the Uniform Building Code.47 
This code also contains a repair standard; it directs public agencies 
to order repair rather than demolition if the building "reasonably 
can be repaired."48 But if the cost of repair exceeds fifty per cent of 
the current replacement cost of the building, 49 demolition is the 
appropriate remedy. 
B. The Constitutional Basis for Demolition 
I. In General 
While the constitutionality of statutes permitting building de-
molition has been established in principle,50 the constitutional ac-
ceptability of the various legislative standards relied upon to autho-
rize demolitions is less clear.51 The problem is that the judicial 
decisions on the subject have taken a course independent of the statu-
tory language;52 some statutes, such as those following the Alaska 
model, have not even been tested. Most of the demolition cases are 
old. They were decided at a time when the constitutional basis for 
public regulatory powers was more primitive, and, as noted above, 
they take as their basic premise the origins of the demolition power 
in equity actions against public nuisances. Even if a statute does not 
explicitly provide that only buildings which are in fact nuisances 
may be demolished,53 the courts often read such a limitation into the 
47. Id. § 302(2). 
48. Id. § 403(a)(l). 
49. Id. § 403(a)(2). For a case involving a similarly detailed provision in a local 
ordinance, see Goldsberry v. City of Omaha, 181 Neb. 823, 151 N.W.2d 329 (1967). 
More detailed specification of the standards for demolition may help guard against a 
finding of unconstitutional delegation of power but would not seem to affect the 
problem of finding a constitutionally supportable basis for the demolition order. 
50. E.g., Polsgrove v. Moss, 154 Ky. 408, 157 S.W. 1133 (1913) (dangerous buildings 
law); Swett v. Sprague, 55 Me. 190 (1867) (same); Maxedon v. Rendigs, 9 Ohio App. 60 
(1917) (same); City of Saginaw v. Budd, 3 Mich. App. 681, 143 N.W.2d 608 (1966), rev'd 
on other grounds, 381 Mich. 173, 160 N.W.2d 906 (1968) (stressing elimination of fire 
hazards); Jackson v. Bell, 143 Tenn. 452, 226 S.W. 207 (1920) (fire hazard law); Thcilan 
v. Porter, 82 Tenn. 622 (1885) (law for condemnation of unhealthy buildings). 
51. One reason for this is that demolition is usually based on a total assessment of 
building condition, so that appellate courts find it difficult to isolate for consideration 
the particular statutory criterion that contributed to the final judgment. 
52. Statutes authorizing the demolition of buildings that are fire hazards may be 
an exception. See Runge v. Glerum, 37 N.D. 618, 164 N.W. 284 (1917); Commissioner 
of State Police v. Anderson, 344 Mich. 90, 73 N.W.2d 280 (1955). 
53. But this interpretation has been read into building demolition statutes even 
though the statute does not specifically declare that dangerous buildings are nuisances. 
York v. Hargardine, 142 Minn. 219, 171 N.W. 773 (1919); State ex rel. Brown v. Arm· 
strong, 206 Okla. 145, 241 P.2d 959 (1952); cf. Thornton v. Chase, 175 Misc. 748, 23 
N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1940). The statute may declare that a structure which violates 
the dangerous building statute is a nuisance, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 280.21 (Supp. 1968). 
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legislation.54 To qualify for demolition under the statutory stan-
dard alone is not enough. This interpretation reflects the sup-
posedly well-established principle that legislation may not declare 
to be a nuisance any use or condition which was not a nuisance 
at common law55-a principle that courts have discarded in other 
areas of land use regulation in favor of more modem due process 
interpretations which emphasize the reasonableness of the control. 
Zoning is perhaps the best case in point.56 Some of the more recent 
building demolition cases57 have been decided under modern doc-
trine, and demolition has been upheld if it is reasonable under all 
of the circumstances.58 But this approach is not typical. 
Because most of the demolition cases are based on the nuisance 
rationale originated in equity, they start with the basic equitable 
premise that demolition is an extreme remedy to be ordered only in 
Or the public nuisance standard may be stated as an alternative basis for demolition. 
IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6144 (Supp. 1968). 
54. E.g., McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 Colo. 281, 244 P. 1017 (1926); Western 
&: Atlantic R.R. v. City of Atlanta, 113 Ga. 537, 38 S.E. 996 (1901); Cole v. Kegler, 64 
Iowa 59, 19 N.W. 843 (1884); Maxedon v. Rendigs, 9 Ohio App. 60 (1917); State ex rel. 
Shulman v. City of Cleveland, 8 Ohio Misc. 1, 220 N.E.2d 386 (C.P. 1966); Cummings 
v. Lobsitz, 42 Okla. 704, 142 P. 993 (1914); Gow Why v. City of Marshfield, 138 
Ore. 167, 5 P.2d 696 (1931); Township of Ridley v. Patrycia, 51 Del. Co. 474 (Pa. 
C.P. 1963); Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810 (1923); cf. Yates 
v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497 (1870); Ajamian v. Township of North Bergen, 103 N.J. 
Super. 61, 246 A.2d 521 (L. 1968) (closing order). But cf. City of Bakersfield v. Miller, 
64 Cal. 2d 93, 410 P .2d 393, 48 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1966). 
The requirement that the building which is destroyed must be a nuisance can be 
the basis for an action for the recovery of damages when the building is destroyed 
but is later found not to have been a nuisance. For a good discussion, see McMahon 
v. City of Telluride, supra. Contra, Moton v. City of Phoenix, 100 Ariz. 23, 410 P .2d 
93 (1966). 
55. For a modern echo of this doctrine, see Commonwealth v. Christopher, 184 Pa. 
Super. 205, 132 A.2d 714 (1957), invalidating an ordinance prohibiting the storage of 
junked automobiles within the municipality. 
56. The United States Supreme Court said as much in the leading case of Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Goldblatt v. Town of 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (ordinance prohibiting pit excavation below water 
level); King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 305 (1881) (fire limits); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 
235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y. Supp. 888 (1968) (zoning case); cf. Allison v. City of Richmond, 
51 Mo. App. 133 (1892), which suggests that cities may be given power by statute to 
declare nuisances which would not be considered such at common law. 
57. Springfield v. City of Little Rock, 226 Ark. 462, 290 S.W.2d 620 (1956); Combs 
v. City of New Albany, 218 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1966); Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 
2d 318, 99 N.W.2d 156 (1959); cf. Goldsberry v. City of Omaha, 181 Neb. 823, 151 
N.W.2d 329 (1967). 
58. The judicial approaches to building demolition cases may be altered by the 
availability of administrative procedures in more modern statutes and ordinances 
which predicate a demolition order on explicit findings of fact by an administrative 
tribunal. In one such case, the appellate court contented itself with a review of the 
facts used to justify the demolition without inquiring into the constitutionality of the 
ordinance under which the demolition was ordered. Keiner v. City of Anchorage, 378 
P .2d 406 (Alaska 1963). This approach is correct only if the court is willing to accept 
as constitutional the statutory basis on which demolition is ordered. See Ukkonen v. 
City of Minneapolis, 160 N.W .2d 249 (Minn. 1968). 
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extreme cases.59 Demolition has been strictly limited to build-
ings in such bad physical repair that they present a structural, fire, 
or other physical hazard. Whatever the statutory formula, the cases 
have generally held that mere dilapidation60 or age61 is not enough 
to justify demolition unless there is an imminent danger traceable to 
the structure's physical condition.62 Another important limitation 
is the reluctance of equity to order demolition when the substandard 
condition arises from mere use of the building.63 In this event, 
abatement of the use affords a sufficient remedy. While the objec-
tionable use cases have usually involved nonstructural conditions 
such as accumulated rubbish, the presence of undesirable transients, 
or similar problems, the decisions can be extended to other con-
ditions for which the statutes authorize demolition. For example, 
overcrowding64 easily classifies as an improper use which can be 
abated; presumably lack of sanitary and other health and safety facil-
ities65 can be treated in the same way. Once the needed facilities 
have been supplied by the mvner, it can be argued that the use of 
the building is legal and demolition unnecessary. This line of author-
59. For application and discussion of this principle in a recent case, see Village of 
Zumbrota v. Johnson, 161 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1968) (notice to property owner held 
insufficient). See also Polsgrove v. Moss, 154 Ky. 408, 157 S."W. 1133 (1913), explicitly 
applying common-law principles in the interpretation of a dangerous building statute, 
and Smith v. Irish, 37 App. Div. 220, 55 N.Y. Supp. 837 (1899). 
60. Radney v. Town of Ashland, 199 Ala. 635, 75 S. 25 (1917); Commissioner of State 
Police v. Anderson, 344 Mich. 90, 73 N.W.2d 280 (1955); Maxedon v. Rendigs, 9 Ohio 
App. 60 (1917); Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810 (1923). 
61. E.g., Radney v. Town of Ashland, 199 Ala. 635, 75 S. 25 (1917). Age, as a statu• 
tory condition justifying demolition, appears most frequently in the fire hazard acts. 
See notes 28 and 29 supra. 
62. If the building is in a dangerous condition, that may be enough to justify 
demolition. Runge v. Glerum, 37 N.D. 618, 164 N.W. 284 (1917) (applying state fire 
hazard statute); cf. O'Rourke v. City of New Orleans, 106 La. 313, 30 S. 837 (1901). 
This line of authority casts doubt on those statutes which would authorize demolition 
of structures on the basis of nonstructural conditions, such as abandonment. See the 
statutes cited in note 41 supra. 
63. Cuba v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co., 150 Ala. 259, 43 S. 706 (1907); Echave v. 
City of Grand Junction, 118 Colo. 165, 193 P.2d 277 (1948); Albert v. City of Mountain 
Home, 81 Idaho 74, 337 P.2d 377 (1959); Welch v. Stowell, 2 Mich. 332 (1846); Allison 
v. City of Richmond, 51 Mo. App. 133 (1892); Health Dept. of City of New York v. 
Dassori, 21 App. Div. 348, 47 N.Y. Supp. 641 (1897); Miller v. Burch, 32 Tex. 208 
(1869); Verder v. Ellsworth, 59 Vt. 354, 10 A. 89 (1887); cf. Eaton v. Klemm, 217 Cal. 
362, 18 P.2d 678 (1933), in which the city attempted to demolish a building on the 
ground that it was a nonconforming use in violation of the zoning ordinance. These 
cases cast doubt on the propriety of a provision such as that found in the Maine law, 
which authorizes demolition of a building if it "is unsuitable or improper for the use 
or occupancy to which it is put." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2851 (Supp. 1967). 
But cf. Nazworthy v. City of Sullivan, 55 Ill. App. 48 (1894), in which the court approved 
demolition because it found that the objectionable use-tramps and other undesirables 
frequented the building-was caused by the building's dilapidated condition; cf. Martin 
v. Foreman, 18 Ark. 249 (1856). 
64. Several statutes authorize demolition of overcrowded buildings. See note 41 supra. 
65. Several statutes authorize demolition of buildings having inadequate sanitary 
and other health and safety facilities. See notes 32 and 41 supra. 
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ity suggests that the courts will not look favorably upon statutes 
which call for demolition when serious structural disrepair is not 
present-at least to the extent that they continue to employ the 
nuisance rationale. Statutes such as the Alaska law authorizing 
demolition for a violation of zoning and similar ordinances are 
especially suspect.66 
2. The Repair Test for Demolition 
A corollary to equity's bias against the demolition remedy is a 
preference for repair as an alternative. Some of the legislation, as 
we have seen, follows equity by explicitly providing a reasonable 
repair test as the basis for exercising the demolition power, but the 
equity bias survives in the cases even in the absence of such an ex-
plicit provision. This judicial interpretation is supported by the 
typical statutory authorization of repair or demolition as alternative 
remedies, even in the absence of an explicit repair test;67 similarly, 
statutes authorizing the removal of buildings as fire hazards force 
attention to the removal of the hazard rather than demolition of the 
building as the statutory objective. 68 Some courts will order repair 
rather than demolition whenever repair can eliminate the fire or 
other danger.60 
66. The nuisance basis of demolition decisions has considerable influence on another 
problem in the application of demolition laws-whether these laws may be applied 
retroactively to buildings in existence before they were enacted. The issue has not been 
raised in the demolition cases, probably because of the judicial insistence that the 
building must qualify as a nuisance to qualify for demolition. The issue has been 
presented by housing and safety codes, and the courts have usually held that these 
statutes may be applied retroactively to compel the repair of buildings which were in 
existence prior to enactment of the particular code. E.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. 
Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946); Kaukas v. City of Chicago, 27 Ill. 2d 197, 188 N.E.2d 700, appeal 
dismissed, 375 U.S. 8 (1963); City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W .2d 869 (Ky. 1960); 
Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937); Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 
HARV. L. REv. 1115 (1956). A few recent cases have held to the contrary in the housing 
code context. City of Columbus v. Stubbs, 223 Ga. 765, 158 S.E.2d 392 (1967) (cumula-
tive minor violations); Dente v. City of Mount Vernon, 50 Misc. 2d 983, 272 N.Y.S.2d 65 
(Sup. Ct. 1966); Gates Co. v. Housing Appeals Bd., IO Ohio St. 2d 48, 225 N.E.2d 222 
(1967) (may be applied retroactively only to eliminate nuisance). While these decisions 
can be dismissed as against the trend of authority, they exhibit a remarkable cor-
respondence to nuisance-based approaches to the demolition power; they tend to limit 
the retroactive application of housing codes to conditions of structural disrepair. 
67. E.g., City of Aurora v. Meyer, 38 Ill. 2d 131, 230 N.E.2d 200 (1967); Application 
of Iverson, 151 Neb. 802, 39 N:W.2d 797 (1949). Cf. the provision that a municipality 
is not eligible for federal assistance in the demolition of a building unless all procedures 
to secure remedial action against the owner have been exhausted. DEMOLITION GRANT 
HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at I. 
68. Cf. Fields v. Stokley, 99 Pa. 306, 44 Am. Rep. 109 (1882). 
69. Commissioner of State Police v. Anderson, 344 Mich. 90, 73 N.W.2d 280 (1955); 
York v. Hargadine, 142 Minn. 219,171 N.W. 773 (1919); Application of Iverson, 151 Neb. 
802, 39 N.W.2d 797 (1949); Application of Suffern, 12 App. Div. 2d 769, 209 N.Y.S.2d 599 
(1961). Application of Suffern, supra, was decided under an unsafe-building statute. 
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Courts have isolated two other approaches to the alternative of 
repair as a test for demolition. One approach gives the owner an 
absolute election to make repairs, regardless of cost or of the rela-
tionship of cost to the value of the structure.70 Another approach 
places sufficient limitations on the right to repair to make the demo-
lition remedy effective against a nonconsenting mmer: repairs may 
not be made whenever the cost of repair is excessive. While judicial 
consideration of excessive cost is usually offhanded and casual, the 
cases have variously suggested that repairs will not be allowed when 
repair requires the substantial reconstruction of the building,71 when 
the cost of repair exceeds the value of the building,72 or when re-
pairs cannot be made at a reasonable cost.73 Even this attempt to 
distinguish judicially imposed cost limitations on the right to repair 
pushes the cases too far; the courts simply accept the repair test 
which was recognized in equity-repair is held to be the preferable 
alternative whenever it is practicable. 
As indicated above, some statutes have codified the repair test 
for demolition, often by expressing it in comparative terms. These 
statutes commonly provide that demolition may be ordered when-
ever the needed repairs exceed a fixed percentage of building value. 
This standard is not only easy to administer, but is also easily trans-
lated into a measure of compensation. For example, when the repair 
ratio is exceeded, the building should be subject to acquisition with-
out compensation because, alternatively, it could be demolished 
without compensation. Because of its adaptability as a measure of 
compensation, the repair ratio demands further examination. 
Repair ratio tests for demolition were first developed as part of 
local ordinances establishing so-called fire limits within a city. Some-
All of the other cases were decided under fire hazard laws; cf. Iverson v. Keith County, 
152 Neb. 565, 41 N.W.2d 858 (1950). 
70. Smith v. Lippman, 222 Ind. 261, 53 N.E.2d 157 (1944); State ex rel. Brooks v. 
Crook, 84 Mont. 478, 276 Pac. 958 (1929); Abraham v. City of Warren, 67 Ohio App. 492, 
37 N.E.2d 390 (1940); Maxedon v. Rendigs, 9 Ohio App. 60 (1917); In re Branham, 70 
Ohio L. Abs. 491, 128 N.E.2d 671 (1953). See especially the comments of the court in 
Armistead v. City of Los Angeles, 152 Cal. App. 2d 319, 313 P.2d 127 (1957). 
71. City and County of Honolulu v. Caveness, 45 Hawaii 232, 364 P.2d 646 (1961); 
City of Aurora v. Meyer, 38 Ill. 2d 131, 230 N.E.2d 200 (1967); Crossman v. City of 
Galveston, ll2 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810 (1923); West v. City of Borger, 309 S.W.2d 250 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958). 
72. Birch v. Ward, 200 Ala. ll8, 75 S. 566 (1917); Takata v. City of Los Angeles, 
154 Cal. App. 2d 174, 7 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1960); Perepletchikoff v. City of Los Angeles, 
174 Cal. App. 2d 697, 345 P.2d 261 (1959); Stoetzner v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 
App. 2d 394, 338 P.2d 971 (1959); cf. People v. Vasquez, 144 Cal. App. 2d 575, 301 P.2d 
510 (1956). 
73. Polsgrove v. Moss, 154 Ky. 408, 157 S.W. II33 (1913); cf. Paderefsky v. Scala, 129 
N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
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times authorized by state statute,74 these ordinances establish an 
area, usually in the center of the city, within which only fireproof 
buildings can be constructed.715 To advance this objective, the fire 
limits ordinance or the authorizing statute prohibits the repair,76 
or authorizes the demolition,77 of a nonconforming building within 
the fire limits whenever the building requires repairs in excess of a 
specified percentage of its value.78 Usually the repair ratio is set at 
fifty per cent, but lower ratios have been used. 
"\Vhen the constitutionality of these repair ratios has been in is-
sue, courts have approved them on the ground that legislation may, 
within reasonable limits, fix the level of deterioration which justifies 
demolition. Fifty,79 and even thirty80 per cent ratios have been ac-
cepted. This rationale has been extended to cover a fifty per cent 
repair ratio in a local demolition provision which was not part of 
a fire limits ordinance.81 Judicial acceptance of repair ratios as the 
74. E.g., MoNT. REv. CoDFS .ANN. § 11-928 (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-01(37) 
(1968). 
75. See the ordinance provision quoted in City of Shenandoah v. Replogle, 198 
Iowa 423, 199 N.W. 418 (1924). 
76. E.g., Zalk 8e Josephs Realty Co. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 60, 253 N.W. 
8 (1934). Some of the more modern ordinances permit repair of a building if the repairs 
arc in conformity with building and housing code standards. E.g., Perepletchikoff v. 
City of Los Angeles, 174 Cal. App. 2d 697, 345 P.2d 261 (1959). 
77. Since the fire limits ordinances are aimed at safety from fire, demolition under 
an application of the repair ratio may be available only following damage by fire. In 
other instances, the ratio may be applied to authorize demolition of any substandard 
and deteriorated building, even in the absence of fire or other casualty. For a modem 
example of a fire limits ordinance, see UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL 
REsEARCH AND SERVICE, PROPOSED BUILDING CODE FOR SMALL CITIFS § 32 (4th ed. 1964). 
78. These ordinances have been sustained against the contention that they are an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. West Realty Co. v. Ennis, 147 Conn. 
602, 164 A.2d 409 (1960); State v. Lawing, 164 N.C. 492, 80 S.E. 69 (1913). 
79. Perepletchikoff v. City of Los Angeles, 174 Cal. App. 2d 697, 345 P.2d 261 (1959); 
Baird v. Bradley, 109 Cal. App. 2d 365, 240 P.2d 1016 (1952); Zalk 8e Josephs Realty Co. 
v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 60, 253 N.W. 8 (1934); Russell v. City of Fargo, 28 
N.D. 300, 148 N.W. 610 (1914); City of Odessa v. Halbrook, 103 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1937); De Von v. Town of Orville, 120 Wash. 317, 207 P. 231 (1922); Annot. 14 
A.L.R.2d 73, 80-82 (1950). Cf. First Natl. Bank of Mt. Vernon v. Sarlls, 129 Ind. 201, 
28 N.E. 434 (1891), invalidating an absolute prohibition on repairs exceeding three 
hundred dollars. The ordinances in the two California cases permitted conforming 
repairs. 
80. Davison v. City of Walla Walla, 52 Wash. 453, 100 P. 981 (1909). A 40% ratio 
was approved in A. H. Jacobson Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., Ltd., 83 F. Supp. 
674 (D. Minn. 1949) (buildings damaged by fire or other cause); cf. Ironside v. City of 
Vinita, 6 Indian Terr. 485, 98 S.W. 167 (1906) (25% ratio; constitutionality not con-
sidered). Contra, Bettey v. City of Sidney, 79 Mont. 314, 257 P. 1007 (1927), holding 
unconstitutional a 35% ratio, in part because it was based on assessed value. The 
court suggested that an acceptable ratio of repair would have to provide the equivalent 
of the substantial reconstruction rule. 
81. Soderfelt v. City of Drayton, 79 N.D. 742, 59 N.W.2d 502 (1953) (50%): cf. Keiner 
v. City of Anchorage, 378 P .2d 406 (Alaska 1963), which accepted, without discussion, 
the validity of a 50% cost-of-repair provision in a local building code. 
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basis for ordering demolition is surprising in view of the cases con-
sidering the constitutionality of demolition in the absence of such 
provisions. Even a :fifty per cent ratio would prohibit repair at a 
level well below the "substantial reconstruction" and similar tests 
which some courts have selected to measure an excessive repair 
burden. Most courts, however, have not noticed this problem.82 
Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that repair ratio provisions 
have usually been considered in the fire limits context, where their 
aim is to achieve a designated standard of building construction 
rather than to serve as an absolute basis for building demolition.83 
Even more difficult problems have developed in the search for 
a formula to determine the building value against which the repairs 
are to be compared. Under the repair ratio test, the value of the 
building and the required repairs are interdependent variables. 
However, since a :finding that a building is subject to demolition 
implies that it has no value at all, either an independent basis must 
be found for estimating building value or the value selected will be 
self-serving. 
Several standards for measuring building value are available. 
The required repairs may be compared with the original value of 
the structure, the present value of the structure, or the value of a 
82. But see Bettey v. City of Sidney, 79 Mont. 314, 257 P. 1007 (1927). Cf. the cases 
in which the municipality, without seeking demolition of the building, has sought to 
prohibit its repair. The courts have approved this remedy. E.g., City of Shenandoah v. 
Replogle, 198 Iowa 423, 199 N.W. 418 (1924) (building substantially destroyed by fire); 
State v. Lawing, 164 N.C. 492, 80 S.E. 69 (1913) (ordinance prohibited "partial rebuild-
ing"; construed to prohibit substantial repairs). 
83. No constitutional difficulties are presented by the demolition of buildings con-
structed after the enactment of a fire limits ordinance and in violation of it. Maguire 
v. Reardon, 255 U.S. 271 (1921); Miller v. City of Valparaiso, 10 Ind. App. 22, 37 N.E, 
418 (1894); Micks v. Mason, 145 Mich. 212, 108 N.W. 707 (1906); Klingler v. Bickel, 117 
Pa. 326, 11 A. 555 (1887). A few cases have suggested, however, that the repair ratio 
may not be applied retroactively to buildings constructed before a fire-limits ordinance 
was enacted. Perepletchikoff v. City of Los Angeles, 174 Cal. App. 2d 697, 345 P.2d 261 
(1959); Russell v. City of Fargo, 28 N.D. 300, 148 N.W. 610 (1914); cf. Allison v. City of 
Richmond, 51 Mo. App. 133 (1892); Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 
S.W. 810 (1923). Echoing the nuisance origins of the demolition power, these cases 
usually suggest that buildings existing on the date the fire limits are established may 
be demolished under the repair ratio provision only if they are a nuisance in fact. This 
limitation apparently derives from a statement in an early text. 2 H. Woon, NUISANCES 
976 (3d ed. 1893). The cases cited in the text are not pertinent to the building demoli-
tion problem; however, in one recent case, a repair ratio provision was applied without 
discussion to a building which antedated the fire limits ordinance. West Realty Co. v. 
Ennis, 147 Conn. 602, 164 A.2d 409 (1960). The analogy here may be to the nonconform-
ing use provisions of zoning ordinances. Provisions in zoning ordinances which prevent 
the repair or reconstruction of substantially damaged nonconforming buildings have 
been upheld on the ground that the gradual elimination of nonconforming zoning uses 
is one of the objectives of the ordinance. See Mandelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming 
Use: Judicial Restriction of the Power To Zone in Iowa, 8 DRAKE L. REv. 23, 24-26 
(1958). The gradual-elimination rationale has also been voiced in fire limits cases. Zalk 
1/c Josephs Realty Co. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co,, 191 Minn. 60, 258 N.W. 8 (1934), 
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new structure. Which base is selected will have a critical effect on 
the application of the repair ratio. Assume that the original value 
of a building was 10,000 dollars and that the building is presently 
worth 5,000 dollars, but that the reconstruction value of a similar 
new building is 20,000 dollars. If the repairs cost 6,000 dollars, a 
fifty per cent repair ratio is exceeded only if original or present 
value is used. These choice-of-valuation problems have been further 
complicated by the failure to relate repair ratio provisions to the 
standards of local housing and building codes. If building value is 
measured as if the building had been constructed in conformity with 
these codes, the value of the building will be substantially increased 
and the possibility that the repair ratio will be exceeded would be 
reduced accordingly. 
A standard must also be found to determine the character and 
cost of the repairs which are required. Fire limits and building 
demolition legislation does not indicate how the cost of repair is to 
be measured. If the repairs must be made in conformance with 
building and housing codes, their cost will be substantially increased 
and the repair ratio will be more likely to be exceeded. But housing 
codes are less than helpful in defining applicable standards of repair. 
Usually these standards are expressed in general terms,84 and the 
extent of the repair required can be determined only after a field 
inspection of the dwelling. An additional concern is that the rela-
tionship between cost of repair and the substandard conditions 
which qualify a building for demolition has not been made clear. 
Presumably, a substandard condition-such as an improper use-
which does not qualify a building for demolition cannot be con-
sidered when estimating the cost of repair. However, the cases have 
not dealt with this question. 
In the context of fire limits ordinances, no satisfactory solution 
of these problems has developed, although courts have given some 
attention to the building value question.85 New-building value-
that is, replacement value at current prices-is a frequently selected 
84. Housing codes usually provide, in very general terms, that the structure and its 
various components must be kept "in good repair." See Housing Code of New Haven, 
Conn., par. 302, reprinted in D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 660 
(1966). 
85. One rule that bas gained acceptance is that the value of the building should ex-
clude the value of the foundation. West Realty Co. v. Ennis, 147 Conn. 602, 164 A.2d 
409 (1960); Soderfelt v. City of Drayton, 79 N.D. 742, 59 N.W.2d 502 (1953); City of 
Odessa v. Halbrook, 103 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); De Von v. Town of Orville, 
120 Wash. 317,207 P. 231 (1922). This interpretation is questionable, since the condition 
of the foundation clearly must be taken into account when the structural condition 
of the entire building is evaluated. Excluding foundation value lowers the total value 
of the building and increases the possibility that the required repair will exceed the 
repair ratio percentage. 
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legislative standard,86 but when new-building value is used the re-
pair ratio is often not exceeded and decisions on demolition tend 
to be adverse to the public agency.87 Present building value is also 
used; it has been interpreted to mean either present market value88 
or the cost of replacing the original structure. In one recent case, 89 
the owner of a building alleged that the replacement cost of the 
structure should be taken as the cost of constructing a new building 
in conformity with local codes. Relying on the use of the word 
"original" in the local ordinance, the court held that the repair 
ratio should be applied to the value of the building as it had been 
before a damaging fire. Since the building had not conformed to 
the local codes at that time, the court prevented the owner from 
capitalizing on his noncompliance. Interpretations of this kind will 
tend to produce decisions favorable to public agencies seeking demo• 
lition.90 Had the building been valued as if it had conformed, its 
value would have been substantially increased, thus minimizing the 
possibility that the cost of repairs would have exceeded the repair 
ratio. 
II. JusT COMPENSATION FOR SLUM DwELLINGs91 
A. The Market Value Approach 
Our analysis of building demolition legislation resulted in a 
quandary over value. We shall now examine the role that the con-
cept of value plays in determining just compensation for properties 
which are to be acquired by public agencies, either through 
86. The use of such standards may be found, for example, in A. H. Jacobson Co. v. 
Commercial Union Assur. Co., Ltd., 83 F. Supp. 674, 677-78 (D. Minn. 1949); Zalk &: 
Josephs Realty Co. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 60, 64, 253 N.W. 8, 11 (1934); 
West v. City of Borger, 309 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); City of Odessa v. 
Halbrook, 103 S.W .2d 223, 225-26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). 
87. State Fire Marshall v. Fitzpatrick, 149 Minn. 203, 183 N.W. 141 (1921); West v. 
City of Borger, 309 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). But in Zalk &: Josephs Realty 
Co. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 60, 253 N.W. 8 (1934), the result was favorable to 
the city. Another possibility is to lower the repair ratio when new building value is 
used. A. H. Jacobson Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., Ltd., 83 F. Supp. 674 (D. 
Minn. 1949) (40%)· 
88. De Von v. Town of Orville, 120 Wash. 317, 207 P. 231 (1922). See also Fidelity 
&: Guaranty Ins. Corp. v. Mondzelewski, 49 Del. 395, 117 A.2d 369 (1955) (assessed value 
interpreted to mean full market value). 
89. West Realty Co. v. Ennis, 147 Conn. 602, 164 A.2d 409 (1960). 
90. Takata v. City of Los Angeles, 184 Cal. App. 2d 154, 7 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1960). 
See also Keiner v. City of Anchorage, 378 P .2d 406 (Alaska 1963) (repair ratio applied 
to depreciated value of building). 
91. This discussion focuses on the compensation to be paid to owners of substandard 
dwellings, not primarily on the relocation problems of owners who also happen to 
be residents of urban renewal project areas or who are displaced by urban highway, 
public housing, or similar projects. On relocation problems, See Hearings on S. 698 
Before the Subcomm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 410-14 (1968). 
See also the discussion accompanying notes 163-69 infra. 
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negotiated purchase or in eminent domain proceedings. Although 
just compensation has not been equated constitutionally with value, 
the courts have usually accepted one species of value-market value 
-as the best evidence of what compensation is "just.''92 
Under the prevailing formula, market value is the price which a 
willing buyer would pay a willing seller under assumed conditions 
of balanced supply and demand for the property to be acquired.93 
Three approaches are commonly used to arrive at market value, 
each contemplating the use of different kinds of market evidence. 
Appraisers will often use all three approaches concurrently. Perhaps 
the most favored approach is to receive evidence of past sales of 
comparable property and to derive from that evidence a value for the 
property to be acquired.94 A second approach, less favored, estimates 
the reproduction cost of the property to be acquired and then makes 
92. See generally Cromwell, Some Elements of Damage in Condemnation, 43 IOWA 
L. REV. 191 (1958); Dettelbach, Just Compensation for Real Estate Condemnation, 15 
CLEV,•MAR. L. REv. 171 (1966); McCormick, The Measure of Compensation in Eminent 
Domain, 17 MINN. L. REv. 461 (1933); Note, Techniques of .Measuring Just Compensa-
tion in Eminent Domain Proceedings in New England, 42 B.U. L. REv. 326 (1962); 
Note, 'Methods of Proving Land Value, 43 IowA L. REv. 270 (1958); Comment, Valuation 
of Property in Eminent Domain, 4 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 325 (1957); Note, Methods of 
Establishing "Just Compensation" in Eminent Domain Proceedings in Illinois: A 
Sj'mposium, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 289; Comment, The Measure of Damages in Eminent 
Domain Proceedings in Washington, 2 WASH. L. REv. 192 (1927); Recent Case, Value 
to Owner As a Basis for Compensation, 32 N.D. L. REV, 59 (1956). 
93. For good discussions of the general principles, see Sengstock &: McAuliffe, What 
ls the Price of Eminent Domain?, 44 J. URBAN L. 185 (1966); Note, Valuation Evidence 
in California Condemnation Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 766 (1960). 
94. See generally A. JAHR, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND VALUATION PROCEDURE 
§§ 137-42 (1957); L. 0RGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 37-146 
(2d ed. 1953); Dempsey, Evidence of Prices in Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Proceed-
ings, 63 DICK. L. REv. 5 (1958); Recent Decision, Evidence: Admission of Testimony of 
Sale Price of Similar Realty in Valuing Real Property in Condemnation Proceedings, 46 
CALIF. L. REv. 630 (1958); Note, .Methods of Proving Land Value, 43 IOWA L. REv. 270 
(1958); Note, Evidence-Sales of Similar Land As Evidence of Value in Condemnation 
Proceedings, 34 KY. L.J. 209 (1946); Recent Case, Evidence-Eminent Domain-Admis-
sibility of Sales of Other Land To Prove the Value of the Land About To Be Con• 
demned, 1·1 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1930); Note, Admissibility of Prices Paid for Other 
Properties As Proof of Damages in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 
204 (1958); Note, T'aluation Evidence in California Condemnation Cases, 12 STAN. L. 
REV. 766 (1960); Recent Decision, Selling Price of Similar Property Held Admissible To 
Prove Value of Condemned Property, l SYRACUSE L. REv. 528 (1950); Recent Case, 
Eminent Domain-Evidence of Value-Prices Paid for Similar Tracts of Land, I U. 
DET. L.J. 147 (1932); Note, .Methods of Establishing "Just Compensation" in Eminent 
Domain Proceedings in Illinois: A Symposium, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 289; Recent Case Note, 
Eminent Domain-Evidence-Admissibility of Sales Price of Neighboring Property To 
Prove Value of Condemned Property, 39 YALE L.J. 748 (1930). 
To be considered for valuation purposes, a comparable sale must have been volun-
tary, the property which was sold must have had similar characteristics, and the sale 
must have been recent. Evidence of comparable sales has considerable probative value 
because it is capable of direct proof. But the choice of comparable property is often 
complicated in urban renewal project areas as uses may be transitional. For an illustra• 
tive case see Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 341, 
59 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967), noted in, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 180. 
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an adjustment for depreciation.95 A third approach contemplates the 
capitalization of the income of the property to be acquired.96 Here, 
the appraiser estimates net rentals for the remaining economic life 
of the building and then capitalizes them at an assumed capitaliza-
tion rate to produce a value. 
Not even these three approaches to market value tell the whole 
story, however. Eminent domain awards are based on findings of 
fact; consequently, when eminent domain awards are challenged 
they come to the appellate tribunal with all of the presumptions that 
protect findings of fact. Appellate courts and trial judges have only 
indirect and limited controls over these awards through rules of law 
restricting the evidence which the trier of fact may consider in de-
termining just compensation.97 The several approaches to mar-
ket valuation outlined above provide one set of controls. Another 
important control which can have an effect on the valuation of slum 
property is the unit rule of valuation.98 Under this rule land and 
building must be valued as a unit, and an award of compensation 
may not be based on a summation of the value of the land and the 
value of the building as separate items. A qualification of the unit 
rule requires that no value be attributed to the building if it does 
not enhance the value of the land;99 this qualification may operate 
95. See generally A. JAHR, supra note 94, at §§ 155-58; L. ORGEL, supra note 94, at 
§§ 188-99; Curtis, Just Compensation in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 35 NEB. L. REV. 
250 (1956); Note, Valuation Evidence in California Condemnation Cases, 12 STAN. L. 
REv. 766 (1960); Note, Methods of Establishing "Just Compensation" in Eminent Domain 
Proceedings in Illinois: A Symposium, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 289. 
96. See generally L. ORGEL, supra note 94, at § 185; Curtis, supra note 95; Note, 
Techniques of Measuring Just Compensation in Eminent Domain Proceedings in New 
England, 42 B.U. L. REv. 326 (1962); Comment, Real Estate Valuation in Condemnation 
Cases-The Place for the Expert, 43 NEB. L. REv. 137 (1963); Note, Valuation Evidence 
in California Condemnation Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 766 (1960). 
Notice, however, that profits and other nonrental income are excluded. A. JAHR, 
supra note 94, at §§ 146-51. 
97. For a vivid illustration of this point in th~ context of a review of an award for 
slum tenements, see In re City of New York, I N.Y.2d 428, 186 N.E.2d 478, 154 N.Y.S.2d 
I (1956). 
98. Devou v. City of Cincinnati, 162 F. 633 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 577 (1908); 
City of Chicago v. Giedraitis, 14 Ill. 2d 45, 150 N.E.2d 577 (1958); Saathoff v. State 
Highway Commn., 146 Kan. 465, 72 P .2d 74 (1937); Texas Pac.-Missouri Pac. Terminal 
R.R. of New Orleans v. Rouprich, 166 La. 352, 117 s. 276 (1928); J. SACKMAN, NIOIOL's 
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1964). See generally H. KALTENBAOI, JUST 
COMPENSATION REVISED § 1-6-2 (1964); Winner, The Rules of Evidence in Eminent 
Domain, 32 DICTA 243 (1955); Note, Methods of Establishing "Just Compensation" in 
Eminent Domain Proceedings in Illinois: A Symposium, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 289, 294. 
But see State ex rel. State Highway Commn. v. Dockery, 300 S.W .2d 444 (Mo. 1957); 
Annot., I A.L.R.2d 878, 884 (1948). 
Whether the unit rule is inconsistent with the use of the reproduction-cost-less-
depreciation method of valuing buildings and structures has never been settled; cf. 
State v. Red Wing Laundry &: Dry Cleaning Co., 253 Minn. 570, 93 N.W.2d 206 (1958) 
(held not inconsistent). 
99. United States v. Certain Lands in Orangetown Township, 69 F. Supp. 815 
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in the case of slum dwellings to exclude any award of compensation 
for the building. The owner will be awarded compensation for only 
the site. It is worth noting that this separation of site and building 
for purposes of valuation is implicitly recognized in building demo-
lition legislation, which operates only against the structure and 
leaves the cleared building site in the hands of the owner. 
B. Inadequacies of the Market-Value Standard in Slum Areas 
For a variety of reasons, none of the conventional approaches to 
market value can be expected to produce ,a realistic valuation for 
property in slum areas.100 The problem is created partly by deficien-
cies in the conventional approaches to market value, and partly by 
the nature of the market for slum housing itself.101 To illustrate 
this point, assume a typical deteriorated tenement in a slum neigh-
borhood. Because the biulding is obsolete and violates local housing 
and building codes, it is not likely to be reproduced in the market. 
Therefore, any attempt to estimate its cost of reproduction must 
necessarily be artificial; an attempt to calculate depreciation on the 
basis of reproduction cost would be equally unrealistic.102 
Nor does the income-capitalization approach produce more re-
liable answers. The income-capitalization method of valuation either 
ignores the role of borrowed capital or assumes that the market for 
(SD.N.Y. 1947); Honolulu v. Bishop Trust Co., 48 Hawaii 444, 404 P.2d 373 (1965); 
Department of Public Works &: Bldgs. v. Hubbard, 363 Ill. 99, 1 N.E.2d 383 (1936); 
Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. 8e P. Ry. Co., 239 Iowa 149, 30 N.W .2d 743 (1948); Kentucky 
Dept. of Highways v. Branham, 380 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1964); Kentucky Dept. of Highways 
v. Stamper, 345 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1961); In re Blackwell's Island Bridge Approach, 198 
N.Y. 84, 91 N.E. 278 (1910); In re Bd. of Supervisors of Chenango County, 6 N.Y.S.2d 
732 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Lower Nueces River Water Supply Dist. v. Sellers, 323 S.W .2d 324 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Chesapeake &: O. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 134 W. Va. 619, 60 S.E.2d 
203 (1950); J. SACKMAN, supra note 98, at §§ 13.11, 16.101[1], 20.1; Annot., 172 A.L.R. 
236, 257-58 (1948). The rule has been codified in California. CALIF. Evm, CODE § 820 
(1966). 
100. The critique of conventional approaches to market value which follows is based 
principally on the work of Professor Richard Ratcliff. See R. RATCLIFF, CURRENT PRAC-
TICES IN INCOME PROPERTY APPRAISAL-A CRITIQUE (1967); R. RATCLIFF, A REsrATEMENT 
OF APPRAISAL THEORY (1963); R. Ratcliff, Condemnation Awards and Appraisal Theory 
(mimeo, undated); Ratcliff, Capitalized Income Is Not Market Value, 36 APPRAISAL J. 
33 (1968). For a more limited criticism of methods of valuation in California, see 
California Law Revision Commn., A Recommendation and Study Relating to Evidence 
in Eminent Domain Proceedings (1960). 
IOI. We have very little empirical evidence on the operation of the housing market 
in slum areas. Perhaps the most thorough recent study is G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT 
LANDLORD (1966), on which the following discussion is primarily based. The Stemlieb 
study was carried out in the Newark slums. See also W. GRIGSBY, HousrNG MARKETS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1963). 
102. See In re Bellevue Hosp. Psychopathic Pavilion, 132 Misc. 774, 230 N.Y. Supp. 
411 (Sup. Ct. 1928), holding that the cost of reproduction method of valuation was im-
properly applied to a group of old, cold-water New York City tenements. See also 
Sackman, The Limitations of the Cost Approach, 36 APPRAISAL J. 53 (1968). 
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financing is operating normally.103 Yet in slum areas the character 
and availability of financing is the primary determinant of market 
value.104 Since conventional low-interest financing is usually un-
available, mortgages on slum property are first inflated and then 
discounted to offset the high risk of lending and to increase the 
legal interest rate. Inflated mortgages produce a corresponding in-
flation of sales prices.105 Furthermore, slum property is not usually 
bought for an income return on investment; investors in slum real 
estate are more interested in quick turnover which permits the fast 
recapture of their cash outlay.106 In these circumstances, selection of 
a capitalization rate is a risky venture,107 especially since the geo-
103. "There is no provision in the formula for independent variables which represent 
the exogenous factors such as business conditions, credit conditions and other market 
restraints." Ratcliff, Capitalized Income Is Not Market Value, 36 .APPRAISAL J. 33, 36 
(1968). 
104. G. STERNLIEB, supra note 101, at 79. 
105. See W. Lehman, Mortgage Availability in Racially Transitional Areas (mimeo; 
1962); G. STERNLIEB, supra note 101, ch. 5. Prices have often been inflated by as much 
as 50% or 100%, sometimes in successive transactions very close together in time. 
106. Mandelker & Heeter, Investment Activities of Relocated Tenement Landlords-
A Pilot Study, 1968 URBAN L. ANN. 33, 44-46 (relocation of slum property owners in 
St. Louis). According to this study, only the owners of large numbers of slum properties 
tended to have high turnover rates. Sternlieb found low turnover rates in the Newark 
slums. G. STERNLIEB, supra note 101, at 98-101. For a summary of investment and trading 
patterns in slum real estate, see Johnson, Acquisition Appraisals for Urban Renewal, 
29 APPRAISAL J. 221 (1961). 
Note that owner-occupants and large-scale investors may have very different expecta-
tions in their properties, yet both types of owner are widely distributed and commingled 
throughout slum areas. Nor is the problem made any easier by the fact that properties 
shift frequently from owner-occupiers to absentee investors and back again. To compli-
cate matters further, the purchase of slum properties by owner-occupiers on installment 
land contracts is a frequent substitute for landlord-tenant relationships. 
107. See In re City of New York, 1 N.Y.2d 428, 135 N.E.2d 478, 154 N.Y.S.2d I (1956), 
in whiclI the rent-capitalization method had been applied in the valuation of tenement~ 
taken for an urban renewal project. The New York Court of Appeals held that the 
state appellate division had improperly reduced the compensation award by applying a 
capitalization rate which was higher than the rate adopted by the city's own witness. 
In an ambiguous paragraph, the appellate division had noted that income on these 
properties had remained high because space was at a premium and had indicated tliat 
the substandard condition of the neighborhood should have been considered as a 
factor affecting prices for the buildings. 
The action of the appellate division is especially interesting in view of Sternlieb's 
findings that the purchase price of slum property, usually taken as a multiple of the 
gross rent, has been falling at the same time that the expected rate of return has been 
increasing. He points out that "[t]he profitability of investment in slum properties is 
as much a function of the financial leverage as the percentage of return on gross income." 
G. STERNLIEB, supra note 101, at 79. For his analysis of trends in rent multipliers, see id. 
at 103-04. 
Sternlieb concludes that 
[t]he high rate of current return demanded by investors in slum tenements can 
be summarized as a compound of the fear of costly code crackdowns; the basic 
weakness of the market, both in terms of rental increases and securing full tenancy; 
the risk of outright loss through the complete abandonment of the parcel; and in 
substantial part, the pejoratives which society heaps on the "slum lord." 
Id. at 95-96 (emphasis in original). 
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metric leverage of the rate yields dramatic variations in capitalized 
value from even slight variations in the rate selected. 
Finally, the comparable-sales method of estimating value has 
meaning only if the market for the property under consideration is 
functioning normally. In slum areas, to characterize the operation 
of the real estate market as normal blinks reality. A variety of fac-
tors serve to limit the number of purchasers who are willing to 
make conventional investments in blighted neighborhoods.108 In 
some cities, housing shortages tend to drive the price of slum proper-
ties up. Elsewhere, increasing vacancy rates in the slums may force 
prices down. In almost every large city, Negroes and other minority 
groups are confined to ghetto areas in which real estate prices are 
artificially affected by the inability of minority renters and pur-
chasers to live where they choose. The increasing pace of govern-
mental activity in slum neighborhoods also tends to distort normal 
market conditions. Sometimes these activities have a depressing ef-
fect; the very risk of housing code enforcement, building demoli-
tion under public order, or urban renewal activity may reduce the 
number of investors willing to operate in substandard neighbor-
hoods. Dwellings may be sold or abandoned in the face of intensified 
housing improvement efforts.100 On the other hand, successful public 
renewal and other improvement activities may lead to a general in-
flation of inner city values; slum owners may hold on to their real 
estate in the hope that they will be compensated at inflated prices 
should their properties be acquired as part of a local urban renewal 
project.11° In other instances, the effect of public activity in the 
housing field may be more indirect. Slum clearance, by diminishing 
108. Yet evidence of supply and demand for urban housing is usually not admissible. 
In a condemnation proceeding involving a proposed subdivision, it was held to be 
error (but not prejudicial error) to admit evidence of the housing and subdivision needs 
of the community as an element bearing on the size of the condemnation award. De-
partment of Public Works &: Bldgs. v. Dust, 24 Ill. 2d 119, 180 N.E.2d 499 (1962). 
109. This tendency has been documented in a code enforcement area that was part 
of a large urban renewal project in Nashville, Tennessee. G. J. Hannon, Urban Renewal 
and Household Mobility 59, 60 (rough draft of thesis presented to Department of Urban 
and Regional Planning, University of Wisconsin, Feb. 1965). 
110. G. STERNLIEB, supra note 101, at 164-70. This attitude appears to be characteristic 
of the owners of large amounts of slum property. Similar attitudes were expressed during 
interviews of slum property owners in St. Louis. Holding property in anticipation of its 
acquisition by public agencies will be encouraged whenever the effect of urban renewal 
programs is inflationary rather than deflationary. Increased land values within an urban 
renewal project area must be ignored if they can be traced to and are induced by the 
project. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); In re Addition to Lincoln Square 
Urban Renewal Project, 22 Misc. 2d 619, 198 N.Y.S.2d 248, motion for reconsideration 
denied, 23 Misc. 2d 690, 199 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sup. Ct. 1960). But successful urban renewal 
activity may serve as an inflationary stimulant on property values in contiguous neigh-
borhoods, which may later be drawn into the urban renewal program. 
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the supply of low-rent housing, may create artificial shortages that 
tend to increase the rents of the remaining low-income housing 
stock.111 As one section of the inner city after another becomes sub-
ject to programs of urban renewal and housing improvement, the 
areas left to "normal" market processes gradually disappear.112 
C. Applications of the Market-Value Standard to Slum Housing 
Because conventional approaches to determining market value do 
not produce reliable values in slum areas, courts and legislatures-
while not questioning the adaptability of the market-value standard 
-have attempted to adjust its application on an ad hoc basis to take 
account of slum housing conditions. Policy makers have given little 
thought to a comprehensive re-examination of the slum value prob-
lem; the assumption has been that the market-value standard can 
be made to work. The technique of adjusting market valuation to 
take account of slum housing conditions is derived from established 
precedent in a majority of jurisdictions that compensation in emi-
nent domain proceedings need not be paid for the illegal use of 
property.113 While the market may attach a premium to a profitable 
111. See the discussion in Downs, Uncompensated Non-Construction Costs Which 
Urban Highways and Urban Renewal Impose upon Residential Households, in Hearings 
on Urban Highway Planning, Location, and Design Before the Subcomm. on Roads of 
the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 313, 335-41 (1968). 
Presumably, owners of slum tenements will rely on increased rentals to claim that a 
larger amount of compensation is required when their properties are taken. 
112. As more and more neighborhoods in the core areas of most large cities are 
covered by federally assisted improvement programs of one kind or another, it becomes 
most difficult to characterize the market in any section of the inner city as normal. This 
pattern is vividly illustrated in the maps of St. Louis renewal and rehabilitation areas 
which accompany Mandelker &: Heeter, supra note 106, at 51-56. The impact of publicly 
sponsored housing improvement programs has been heightened, moreover, by the in-
creasingly sophisticated tools that have been made available. Thus, public housing 
authorities may now lease dwellings for rental to public housing tenants throughout 
the area of their jurisdiction. Christensen, The Public Housing Leasing Program: A 
Workable Rent Subsidy?, 1968 URBAN L. ANN. 57. Federal aid is also available for imme-
diate assistance short of renewal in blighted areas. Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 476, § 514. Other examples could be mentioned. 
113. For general discussion, see U.S. HOUSING & HOME FINANCE AGENCY, ADMISSIBILITY 
OF EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL USE OR CONDITION OF PROPERTY IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS 
(1951); Dagen &: Cody, Property, Et Al. v. Nuisance, Et Al., 26 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 
70 (1961); Legislation&: Administration, Determination of Just Compensation in Eminent 
Domain Proceedings for Land Subjected to Illegal Uses or Conditions, 38 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 196 (1963); Note, Condemnation of Slum Land-Illegal Use As a Factor Reducing 
Valuation, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 232 (1947). For textual discussion and citations to cases, 
see A. JAHR, supra note 94, at § 79; J. SACKMAN, supra note 98, at §§ 12.3143, 12.3143[1], 
19.21; L. ORGEL, supra note 94, at § 33. 
Evidence of the illegal use or dilapidation of adjacent property is also admissible as 
tending to show the general condition of the neighborhood, which in turn has a bearing 
on market value. Wilmington Housing Authority v. Nos. 312-314 East Eighth St., 191 
A.2d 5 (Del. Super. 1963). If the comparable-sales approach to valuation is used, the 
court will not consider a sale of other property for illegal purposes as an aid in valuing 
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illegal use in order to reflect the expectation that it will continue 
unmolested,114 most courts have managed to deny any increment in 
compensation arising from the illegality. This is true even though 
the result is to award compensation which is less than the value as-
signed to the property by the market. The cases rely principally on 
the proposition that no one can profit from his own wrongdoing, or 
from speculation that a law will continue to be unenforced.115 
Most of the illegal-use cases in the compensation context have 
considered either uses which are bad in themselves, such as illegal 
gambling,116 or physically severable uses which can easily be dis-
regarded in arriving at a value.117 For instance, some courts have 
refused to award compensation for such physically severable uses as 
illegal encroachments on public ways.118 Because the illegal use of a 
structure does not, strictly speaking, qualify it for demolition, this 
line of authority is difficult to correlate with building demolition 
legislation.119 Nevertheless, several older cases did refuse to place 
a value on illegal uses which amounted to a nuisance or which were 
injurious to third parties.120 "While the factual circumstances of 
these old cases differ from cases involving the demolition of dwell-
the property under consideration. Muccino v. Baltimore &: 0. R.R., 33 Ohio App. 
102, 168 N.E. 752 (1929). 
114. For this reason, the argument has been made that the appraiser should value 
slum property as the market does; if the market is willing to take the risk of non-
enforcement of the housing code, the appraiser should value the property accordingly. 
Nelson, Commentary on "Appraiser's Role in Urban Renewal", 30 .Al>l'RAISAL J. 20, 21, 
22 (1962). This point of view had judicial support in one jurisdiction for a time. 
Freiberg v. South Side Elevated R.R. Co., 221 Ill. 508, 77 N.E. 920 (1906), overruled by 
Department of Public Works 8: Bldgs. v. Hubbard, 363 Ill. 99, 1 N.E.2d 383 (1936). 
115. E.g., Kingsland v. Mayor Alderman, & Commonwealth of City of New York, 
110 N.Y. 569, 18 N.E. 435 (1888). For further discussion, see Legislation & Administration, 
Determination of Just Compensation in Eminent Domain Proceedings for Land Sub-
jected to Illegal Uses or Conditions, 38 NOTRE DAME LAw. 196 (1963). 
116. E.g., McKinney v. Mayor of Nashville, 102 Tenn. 131, 52 S.W. 781 (1899). 
117. See, e.g., Appeal of Phillips, 113 Conn. 40, 154 A. 238 (1931) (encroachment over 
building line); Department of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Hubbard, 363 Ill. 99, I N.E.2d 
883 (1936) (hedges over legal height); Joly v. City of Salem, 276 Mass. 297, 177 N.E. 121 
(1931) (unlawful filling of land). 
118. E.g., In re Pearsall St. in City of New York, 135 N.Y. Supp. 763 (Sup. Ct. 1912). 
119. But see Gear v. City of Phoenix, 93 Ariz. 260, 379 P .2d 972 (1963) (excessive 
parking of cars in violation of city ordinance); cf. In re Throgs Neck Expressway, 16 
App. Div. 2d 570, 229 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1962) (no decrease in value allowed when building 
occupied without certificate of occupancy). 
120. Burke v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 152 Ill. 125, 38 N.E. 670 (1894) (diking of 
condemnee's land would overflow land of others); Castle Heights Water Co. v. Price, 
178 App. Div. 687, 165 N.Y. Supp. 816 (1917) (condemnee claimed compensation for 
water lying under land of others); Portland & Seattle Ry. Co. v. Ladd, 47 Wash. 88, 91 
P. 573 (1907) (mining would have thrown rock on other properties). Consider, in this 
context, the demolition statutes which authorize the demolition of buildings which are 
dangerous to nearby properties. Such buildings would not be compensable in eminent 
domain proceedings on the grounds that they are a nuisance; cf. Harvey v. Lackawanna 
&: Bloomsburg R. Co., 47 Pa. St. 428 (1864). 
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ings, at least they correlate with the nuisance basis of demolition 
law. 
It may be easier to reconcile housing code requirements with 
judicial attempts to adapt the market-value standard to slum hous-
ing conditions. For example, the housing code prohibits overcrowd-
ing. If overcrowding is considered an illegal use, its effect can be 
disregarded when the rent-capitalization approach to market valua-
tion is used; rents are simply calculated on the basis of the legally 
permitted occupancy of the building.121 This approach would pro-
duce a valuation which is below market levels in slum areas. In other 
cases, noncompliance with the housing code is difficult to quantify 
unless the illegality of the use is expressed as the cost of bringing 
the dwelling into compliance with housing code standards. But this 
interpretation assumes the constitutionality of the housing code 
requirements. It also assumes that courts will be willing to accept 
the application of housing code standards in advance of eminent 
domain proceedings, when the application of those standards will 
lead to a reduction in the compensation payable. We return to this 
problem later.122 
When the rent-capitalization approach to valuation has been 
used, some courts have considered the influence of cost of repair on 
net rentals, without indicating just how this influence should be 
calculated.123 However, the assumption underlying these decisions 
seems to be that since the cost of repair will either increase the 
capital investment in the property or the debt charges against gross 
121. For an analagous situation, see Gear v. City of Phoenix, 93 Ariz, 260, 379 P.2d 
972 (1963). 
122. See text accompanying notes 149-169 infra. 
123. Buena Vista Homes v. United States, 281 F.2d 476 (10th Cir. 1960) (holding that 
an allowance is to be made for cost of repair if a building is not in good condition); 
Kaperonis v. Iowa State Highway Commn., 251 Iowa 39, 99 N.W.2d 284 (1959) (affirming 
a low award based on rentals received on physically deteriorated buildings on the 
ground that it was not unjust); Moore v. State, 23 App. Div. 2d 525, 255 N.Y.S.2d 524 
(1965) (where the city had prohibited the residential use of the buildings because of 
their hazardous condition and had advised that rehabilitation might not be allowable, 
~e court suggested that a failure by the property owner's appraiser to consider the 
cost of rehabilitation had exaggerated the amount of net rentals.); In re Lincoln Square 
Slum Clearance Project, 15 App. Div. 2d 153, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1961) (striking down 
the use of the rent-capitalization method and awarding site value on the ground that a 
heating installation needed to keep the building in operation was too expensive for the 
building as an economic unit). But cf. Application of Port Authority Trans-Hudson 
Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 485, 265 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1965), in which rehabilitation was 
found to be feasible and the court permitted consideration of the effect of rehabilitation 
on rents. Here, however, the appraiser had deducted the cost of rehabilitation from 
the capitalized value. Cf. Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Folmer, 231 La. 452, 
91 S.2d 600 (1956), in which a substandard residential dwelling was assigned a value 
under the rent-capitalization method, but the value of the site for a "higher" industrial 
use also equalled the capitalized value of the building. See also In re City of New York, 
l N.Y.2d 428, 136 N.E.2d 478 (1956), discussed in note 107 supra. 
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rent, the net rentals will be reduced accordi11:gly. Another possible 
adjustment in the rent-capitalization approach is to use evidence of 
substandard condition as the basis for a judgment that a building 
has little or no remaining economic life. In one case, only site value 
was awarded for a physically deteriorated property on the ground 
that the investment required to keep the building operative was not 
economically justified. The court held that the building could not 
be considered as a rent-producing structure.124 
The unit rule has also been applied successfully to adjust the 
market value of substandard properties. Recall that under the unit 
rule, land and building are to be valued together and no value is 
to be attributed to the building unless it enhances the value of the 
land. 'When a building has become obsolete due to changes in 
the surrounding area, courts ordinarily disallow any value for the 
building and award only site value.125 These cases do not always 
tum on the physical condition of the building. In some instances, 
courts have found large residential structures worthless because they 
were located in areas that had turned to slums; in others, the physical 
deterioration of the building has been the basis for holding that the 
structure has no value. In such cases, building inspectors' reports 
have been introduced in evidence to demonstrate the futility of 
repair.126 
A few state statutes provide explicit legislative authority for a 
consideration of illegal building use and substandard building con-
dition. While the statutory language varies, all of these laws author-
ize introduction in an eminent domain proceeding of evidence of 
unsafe and insanitary conditions and of illegal uses.127 Two states 
124. In re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project, 15 App. Div. 2d 153,222 N.Y.S.2d 
786 (1961). In this kind of case the court can control the compensation award more 
closely by simply refusing to admit evidence of the value of the building. When the 
building is deteriorated but still has some value, the award will be more difficult to 
control because the evidence introduced will go to the trier of fact. 
125. St. Louis v. Turner, 331 Mo. 834, 55 S.W.2d 942 (1932); McSorley v. School Dist. 
of Avalon Borough, 291 Pa. 252, 139 A. 848 (1927). The effect of the ruling may simply 
be to exclude evidence of the original cost of the structure. Devou v. City of Cincinnati, 
162 F. 633 (6th Cir. 1908); Commonwealth v. Stamper, 345 S.W .2d 640, 643 (Ky. 1961) 
(dictum). See also Moss v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 146 Conn. 421, 151 A.2d 
693 (1959) (discussing functional obsolescence from extrinsic factors). But cf. Bridges v. 
Alaska Housing Authority, 375 P .2d 696 (Alaska 1962). 
126. State ex rel. State Highway Commn. v. Schutte Inv. Co., 334 S.W .2d 241 ~fo. 
1960); Hance v. State Roads Commn., 221 Md. 164, 156 A.2d 644 (1959). See also Com-
monwealth v. Bagley, 261 Ky. 812, 88 S.W.2d 920 (1935). 
127. One group of statutes authorizes the introduction of evidence of "any unsafe, 
unsanitary, substandard or other illegal condition, use or occupancy ••• .'' ILL. REv. 
STAT. ch. •17, § 9.5(2) (Supp. 1969) (eminent domain law). The other statutes are similar: 
KY. REV. STAT. § 99.240(4) (1966) (redevelopment corporations); MICH. COMP. LAws 
§ 12!i.917(3)(d) (1967) (redevelopment corporations); N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAw § 216(4)(d) 
(!955); N.Y. PUBLIC Hous. LAW § 125(4)(e) (1939); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 45·29·32(d) 
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explicitly authorize the introduction in evidence of a public order 
requiring the demolition of an unsafe or insanitary building;128 
three states, less explicitly, authorize the introduction of evidence 
that an unsafe or insanitary building is subject to "elimination."129 
All of the statutes make evidence of illegal use and substandard 
condition admissible even though no public action has been taken 
against the building. Some make such action prima fade evidence 
of the existence of the illegal use or substandard condition.130 
What is missing from these statutes is a comprehensive legisla-
tive basis for translating evidence of substandard condition or illegal 
use-whether by showing the existence of a demolition order or 
otherwise-into a quantitative measure which can be applied in 
determining just compensation. Most statutes do provide that the 
effect of overcrowding on rentals may be considered, 131 and a few 
others permit introduction of evidence showing the "cost to correct" 
any substandard condition which may give rise to a demolition or-
der.132 But, as indicated above, a demolition order may tum on a 
comparison of cost of repair with building value. If the demolition 
order is based on a comparative evaluation of this kind, it is of no 
help in an eminent domain proceeding in which the value of the 
building is the unknown quantity that must be determined.133 A 
(1957) (housing authorities); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.414(2)(b) (1965) (redevelopment cor-
porations). 
Another group of laws authorizes the introduction of evidence of "any use, condi-
tion, occupancy or operation [subject to correction or abatement under state or local 
law] as being unsafe, substandard, [or] insanitary .••• " NEV. REV. STAT. § 279.290(2) 
(1967) (urban renewal). Other statutes are similar, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 40•58·08(2) 
(1968) (urban renewal); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1613(d) (1959) (same). 
Two states admit evidence that a building is "unsafe or unsanitary or a public 
nuisance, or is in a state of disrepair ..•• " Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 12-1150(A) (1956) 
(public works law); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-40 (1966) (same). 
128. Arizona and North Carolina; see note 127 supra. 
129. Nevada [NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 279.290(2) (1967)], North Dakota [N.D. CENT. CoDE 
§ 40-58-08(2) (1968)], and Oklahoma [OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1613(d) (1959)]. 
130. Nevada [NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 279.290(3) (1967)], North Dakota [N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 40-58-08(3) (1968)], Oklahoma [OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1613(e) (1959)], and Wis-
consin [WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.414(2)(b) (1965)]. 
In the absence of some official action against the building, the eminent domain tri-
bunal will have to estimate the cost of repair under the applicable housing code, if any 
-a difficult judgment to make considering the tribunal's lack of expertise and the 
generalized standard of repair which housing codes usually contain. The problem is no 
easier under most demolition legislation. 
131. The exceptions are Nevada [NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 279.290(2) (1967)], North Dakota 
[N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-58-08(2) (1968)], Oklahoma [OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1613(d) 
(1959)], and Rhode Island [R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 45-29-32(d) (1957)]. However, all of 
these states except Rhode Island explicitly authorize consideration of "[t]he effect on 
the value of such property" of the illegal use or condition. Even the statutes which 
authorize consideration of building condition on rentals do not explicitly indicate what 
effect that condition is to have. 
132. Rhode Island and Wisconsin are the exceptions. 
W~- Another point to stress is th~t these statutes do not always match well with the 
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final comment is that these statutes approach the problem of valu-
ing substandard buildings simply by expanding the rules of evi-
dence in eminent domain proceedings. Since the statutes do not 
indicate the weight to be given to evidence of illegal use and sub-
standard condition, it may be completely disregarded by the trier of 
fact. Moreover, a failure to take this evidence into account will be 
difficult to control. There is little empirical evidence on the impact 
of these laws,134 and while experience with the Illinois statute135 pro-
duced substantial reductions in acquisition costs in Chicago,136 doubt 
has been cast on the utility of this legislation.137 
III. CODE STANDARDS OF HOUSING MAINTENANCE AS A BASIS OF 
COMPENSATION FOR SLUM HOUSING 
A. Implementation of the Housing Maintenance Standard 
Among the most serious difficulties presented by ad hoc attempts 
to adjust the market valuation of slum housing by considering the 
impact of housing codes and demolition laws is the necessary as-
sumption that both the codes and the market speak from the same 
premise-that the standards imposed by the codes may serve as a 
corrective to the market's autonomous pricing system. This assump-
tion cannot stand scrutiny, for it is the hallmark of the slum housing 
market that investors are willing to disregard the existence of hous-
ing codes and risk the chance of enforcement. At the same time, 
housing code requirements are imposed independent of what the 
legislation authorizing demolition. While they usually refer to an "unsafe and insani-
tary" basis for demolition, the demolition statutes are not always so limited, and they 
may authorize demolition on different grounds. Cf. the North Dakota statute authorizing 
demolition, note 41 supra. Arizona is the only state which has no statute which explicitly 
authorizes demolition. 
134. A letter from the author to public agencies in each of the states having laws 
authorizing consideration of substandard building conditions in eminent domain pro• 
ceedings brought only one response. Of some interest is the fact that only a few of the 
states having these laws are dominantly urban in character. In addition, a few of these 
provisions appear in redevelopment corporation laws, which are largely dormant. Only 
the Illinois law is of general application. 
135. ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 47, § 9.5(2) (Supp. 1969). 
136. Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-enclosure of Urban Land, 35 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1238, 1251, n.41 (1960). See also Levi, The Impact of Urban Renewal on Real Prop-
erty Law, 41 CHI. B. R.Ec. 443, 446 (1960). 
137. Legislation &: Administration, Determination of Just Compensation in Eminent 
Domain Proceedings for Land Subjected to Illegal Uses or Conditions, 38 NOTRE DAME 
LAw. 196, 198, n.7 (1963), reporting a comment by the Chicago urban renewal commis• 
sioner that the statute conflicts with the unit rule of valuation in eminent domain and 
has not been helpful. The Oklahoma law used by the Tulsa urban renewal authority 
has not been helpful either. Letter from James R. Jessup, Assistant City Attorney, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, to the author, Nov. 7, 1968. Both respondents commented that evidence of 
the substandard condition of slum dwellings could be brought to the attention of court 
and jury without the statute authorizing the introduction of evidence of illegal use. 
666 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:6M 
market can absorb in the way of housing repair and rehabilitation. 
What needs recognition is the fact that housing standards legislation 
provides a basis independent of the market's pricing system for 
judging the compensatory interest in housing. Even if the market 
were able to provide an accurate index of value in slum housing 
areas (and it is not conceded that it can), the public judgment of 
housing condition, expressed in housing maintenance codes, would 
be a more appropriate index of building value on policy grounds. 
No in-depth justification for this preference will be attempted in 
this Article; however, implicit in the judicial acceptance of housing 
codes as the basis of public intervention may be the suggestion that 
these codes necessarily determine the compensatory interest in sub-
standard housing as well.138 
A first step in evaluating housing code standards as a measure of 
compensation is to reconsider the treatment alternatives of repair 
and demolition. Treatment choices in housing programs must 
not be totally dependent on constitutional necessity, but rather 
should reflect other social and economic factors. To consider demoli-
tion and repair as mutually exclusive treatment possibilities-as the 
equity bias against demolition suggests-does not take account of 
modern housing practice; for under more sophisticated approaches 
to housing improvement, the choice between demolition and repair 
is often made independent of the physical condition of the build-
ing or even the cost of necessary repairs. A slum dwelling that is 
demolished without compensation in an old Irish district of St. 
Louis would be lovingly rebuilt in the Georgetown section of 
Washington, D.C. One major advantage of the plan to relate levels 
of compensation to compliance with housing repair standards is that 
treatment choices in housing programs can be made on their merits. 
Selection of repair and rehabilitation rather than demolition as the 
necessary cure for substandard conditions depends on a variety of 
factors: the nature of the market for the rehabilitated structure, the 
availability of direct and indirect state and federal subsidies,130 and 
the nature of the comprehensive strategy for housing improvement. 
This strategy may select rehabilitation as the desired measure for 
policy reasons, such as the desire to minimize the relocation prob-
138. This approach gains support from the reliance on need for repair as the basis 
for noncompensable building demolition. 
139. Indirect subsidies through governmental action can be provided through federal 
mortgage insurance programs which encourage lenders to finance rehabilitation prop• 
erties on more favorable terms. Direct subsidies are provided through a variety of 
federal programs. Especially significant as a direct subsidy are the payments authorized 
under Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 476, title I. In part, the 
title authorizes direct subsidies of interest payments on rehabilitated dwellings. 
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lems created by demolition and clearance or the desire to strengthen 
existing low-income neighborhoods.140 · 
Let us next turn to the constitutional problem. Does judicial 
preference for repair, as expressed in the demolition cases, neces-
sarily mean that the courts, as a next step, will accept the standards 
of maintenance required by housing codes? The demolition cases 
necessarily leave this question unsettled, and the courts that have 
passed on the constitutionality of housing codes have not precisely 
indicated what repair burden can constitutionally be imposed. They 
have tended to evaluate the burden of repair in relation to building 
value141-an approach which has all of the difficulties, discussed 
above,142 inherent in cost-of-repair ratios in demolition legislation. 
A more helpful perspective on the constitutional acceptability 
of utilizing housing codes as standards for repair can be achieved by 
comparing the constitutional burden imposed by these codes with 
the constitutional burden of noncompensatory building demolition. 
If needed repairs to a building are so burdensome that the build-
ing may constitutionally be demolished as an alternative to repair, 
could the public agency have elected to compel the repair of the 
building rather than its demolition? For example, assume that the 
cost of repair is found to be sixty per cent of the cost of the building, 
putting aside for the moment the difficulties of applying the repair-
ratio formula. If the building demolition legislation permits demoli-
tion when the cost of repair exceeds fifty per cent of the value of the 
building, the building may be demolished. As an alternative, could 
the public authority have ordered the owner to repair the structure 
under the housing code? This problem has never been explicitly 
considered, but an argument can be made that no constitutional 
distinction should be drawn between the exercise of compulsory 
demolition and compulsory repair powers.143 Demolition of a build-
ing takes the physical structure from the owner, depriving him of 
the capital asset which produced his income flow and compelling 
him either to rebuild or to sell the land at site value to someone 
who will. The mmer's situation may not differ significantly in 
eminent domain proceedings. The eminent domain tribunal may 
140. In this context, it is significant that the urban renewal and Model Cities pro-
grams contain preferences for rehabilitation rather than clearance. 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) 
(Supp. II, 1967) (urban renewal); MODEL CITIES ADllllNISIRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING 
AND URJIAN DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF URBAN LIFE: A PROGRAM GUIDE TO 
MODEL NEIGHJIORHOODS IN DEMONSTRATION CITIES § 1.4-8 (Dec. 1967) (model cities). 
141. See cases cited in notes 66 and 67 supra; Apple v. City&: County of Denver, 154 
Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964); State v. Schaffel, 4 Conn. Cir. 234, 229 A.2d 552 (1966); 
Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959). 
142. See text accompanying notes 74-90 supra. 
143. The court took this position in York v. Hargadine, 142 Minn. 219, 171 N.W. 
773 (1919). 
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attach no value to the building and award only compensation for 
the site. Compulsory enforcement of the housing code forces the 
owner to invest in his structure if he is to continue to derive in-
come from it. Indeed, as in the example just set forth, the capital 
investment required to rehabilitate a substandard building may be 
substantially greater than the loss which would be produced by its 
demolition. Under closer scrutiny, however, this analysis disregards 
the fact that the o,;vner retains both the land and the building fol-
lowing compliance with a repair order. For this reason, the con-
stitutional impact of a repair order should be evaluated in light of 
the owner's ability to recoup the cost of repair from future rentals.144 
Implementation of the housing maintenance standard for valuing 
slum property must begin with a code definition of a realistic mini-
mum level of housing maintenance.145 Theoretically, this minimum 
standard can be determined by considering all the elements relating 
to fitness for habitation that are required by the housing codes-ele-
ments such as required space and occupancy, sanitary facilities, in-
gress and egress, plumbing, heating equipment, and structural 
strength. Considered together, all of these required elements should 
permit a public agency to define a model minimum structure for 
single or multiple dwelling units.146 The value of each element in 
144. Another solution to this problem would be to value the building as a rehabili• 
tated structure and then to deduct the cost of repair. The residue would represent the 
value of the structure before rehabilitation. This approach was suggested in Johnson, 
supra note 20, at 188. But the value of a building after rehabilitation is itself a fictional 
construct which depends on a variety of factors independent of the cost of rehabilitation. 
One of these factors is the availability of a federal subsidy which will reduce rent levels 
and thus help assure a demand. Cf. City of Gainesville v. Chambers, 162 S.E.2d 460 
(Ga. App. 1968), where the condemnee urged the abandonment of the market-value 
approach and argued that his property should be valued at an amount higher than 
market value because it was slum property producing a high return on investment. 
The court rejected this argument. 
145. Most housing codes impose minor obligations that probably are not essential 
to minimum standards of maintenance; accordingly, these should not be included in 
the definition of the minimum standard. For example, the housing code in one major 
city requires a peep hole in every front door. While the courts have not had extensive 
opportunities to evaluate the constitutional acceptability of the housing code compliance 
burden, there are indications that the courts may balk at forcing compliance with minor 
requirements of good housekeeping and repair. See cases cited in note 67 supra. Com• 
pliance with some of these standards can be quite expensive. One large midwestem 
city requires lights in all closets. For purposes of determining appropriate levels of 
compensation, the compliance burden may simply have to be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis. Another approach is the more widespread adoption of state housing codes, accom· 
panied by state administrative determination of maintenance and repair requirements. 
Space and occupancy requirements of housing codes are also troublesome. Overinfla-
tion of rentals through overcrowding can produce excessive valuations when the rent• 
capitalization approach is used. Under the proposal put forward here, value depends 
on building condition, and overcrowding of the building can be disregarded except to 
to extent that it is reflected in substandard maintenance or inadequate facilities. 
146. Surprisingly little work has been done in the United States to translate the 
minimum requirements of housing codes into rehabilitation and repair costs, although 
some innovative work along these lines has been carried out in Philadelphia. The 
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the model structure could then be separately estimated. When 
the public agency is faced with a decision about a particular 
building in a slum area, it could estimate the repair cost-element-
by-element-necessary to bring the structure into conformity with 
the minimum standard defined by the aggregation of required ele-
ments. The building owner would be entitled to compensation equal 
to the amount by which the value of a comparable structure con-
forming to the minimum standard of housing maintenance exceeds 
the cost of repair. This figure would approximate the degree to 
which the owner had complied with the housing code. For example, 
assume that a heating plant, or any other single required element, 
which is constructed in compliance with housing code standards 
would cost 2,000 dollars. Assume also that a slum building has a 
defective heating plant which would cost 1,000 dollars to repair. 
The owner of the building would be entitled to half of the value of 
a code-complying heating plant, or 1,000 dollars, no matter what 
technique the public agency decided to employ with regard to the 
property. 
In an eminent domain proceeding, the mvner would be awarded 
compensation which reflects the extent to which the building com-
plies with housing maintenance standards. The site would be valued 
separately-an approach which directly contradicts the unit rule, 
but which reflects the reality that in slum areas the site has a value 
independent of the building that stands on it. I£ the public agency 
preferred demolition-the cleared site to stay in the mvner's hands 
-the demolition order would similarly be accompanied by payment 
of compensation which reflects the extent of housing code com-
pliance. However, the housing authority would have to select a 
tipping point with reference to the housing maintenance standards: 
if all or most of the required elements are missing or in serious dis-
repair, the building as it stands will contribute nothing to the value 
of the structure after rehabilitation. In such a situation, the building 
could still be demolished without compensation.147 I£ a repair order 
were selected as the appropriate remedy, an additional adjustment 
English Ministry of Housing and Local Government, however, is developing a method 
of measuring housing blight in which a cost comparison with a model dwelling is the 
key element. Unfortunately, the English method is still in the experimental stage. 
147. Implementation of these proposals will require a substantial reworking of 
demolition, housing code, urban renewal, and related legislation. For example, it 
would probably be desirable to delegate the authority to fix appropriate levels of 
compensation to a state or local administrative agency with expertise in housing in 
order to avoid the vagaries of eminent domain awards by lay tribunals. For the text 
of an early District of Columbia statute, now repealed, which created a similar board 
to make demolition orders, see Metzger v. Markham, 38 App. D.C. 383 (1912). 
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would be required to take account of the mvner's opportunity to 
recoup his investment. Before deducting repair cost from the value 
of a code-conforming structure, the capitalized (but discounted) value 
of the increase in rentals which can reasonably be anticipated after 
rehabilitation should be deducted from the estimated repair cost. 
The owner should receive compensation only to the extent that it 
would be unfair to expect him to recoup the repair burden in this 
way; to this end, the repair order would be enforceable only upon 
payment of compensation representing that portion of the repair 
burden which is excessive.148 
This proposal is, of course, not without its difficulties. One 
problem is that the application of minimum housing maintenance 
standards as a basis for compensation may constitute an unconstitu-
tional manipulation of value unless compensation is paid as if the 
minimum standards had not been activated prior to the time com-
pensation is determined. Valuing slum dwellings on the basis of the 
code standards of housing maintenance may also work hardship on 
owner-occupants of, and investors in, slum property. These persons 
may find that the compensation which is awarded is not sufficient 
to retire existing indebtedness or to secure replacement housing. 
These problems will be discussed in turn. 
B. The De Facto Taking Problem 
The constitutional difficulties likely to arise in the use of housing 
maintenance standards to determine levels of compensation can best 
be understood in the context of eminent domain takings for urban 
renewal. Compensation in eminent domain has a time as well as an 
evidentiary dimension. Compensation is not payable until the date 
of taking,149 variously defined "as the date the petition for condemna-
tion is filed, the date of issuance of summons, time of trial, date of 
the deposit of assessed damages, final decree of condemnation, or 
date of possession by the condemnor .... "150 The time varies by 
jurisdiction but is never earlier than some formal event subsequent 
to the initiation of urban renewal proceedings. Property values 
may be adversely affected during the interim period between the 
initiation of housing improvement projects and the actual date of 
taking. For instance, even though no formal taking has as yet oc-
148. This burden will have to be evaluated in light of the realities of available 
financing, including federal subsidies which can reduce rent levels and assure a captive 
market. These subsidies function as a de facto payment of compensation in return for 
compliance with housing code and rehabilitation standards. 
149. Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence for Unconstitutional 
Practice, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 319 (1963). 
150. Glaves, supra note 149, at 326. 
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curred in an eminent domain proceeding, initiation of demolition 
and housing code enforcement p-Jwers concurrently with urban 
renewal activities may be so burdensome to the property owner that 
a court would find that the property has been taken de facto. There 
are other circumstances in which a court may find that a property 
owner has suffered compensable losses prior to the taking date. 
To understand why property losses may occur before the official 
date of taking, it will be helpful to consider the practical problems 
of carrying out urban renewal projects. Difficuties arise because the 
selection of an urban renewal project area often precedes by several 
years the commencement of project activities.151 Yet the designation 
of such an area may cast an economic pall, discouraging investment 
and repair and encouraging tenant turnover and outmigration. In-
deed, the urban renewal agency has a positive duty to relocate those 
residents in the project area who are displaced by the renewal pro-
ject.152 Once urban renewal activities begin, the pace at which the 
project is carried out may reinforce the negative impact on property 
values. For example, successive acquisition and clearance of slum 
properties will have a cumulative effect on remaining properties; 
these properties may be abandoned, vandalized, and untenanted by 
the time the final stages of the project are reached. Nor is it possible 
to separate the impact of housing code enforcement from urban 
renewal project activities. In some projects, intensive code enforce-
ment will accompany renewal activities that are aimed selectively at 
demolition and rehabilitation throughout the project area. In pro-
jects in which total clearance is contemplated, the renewal agency 
may discourage or prohibit any property improvements once the 
the project is under way.153 Elsewhere in the city, intensive housing 
code enforcement may be chosen as an alternative to urban renewal, 
or may precede urban renewal by several years in housing areas 
which have a relatively low priority in the urban renewal program. 
In the face of these realities, conventional eminent domain doctrine 
will permit a finding at two extremes-either the property owner 
is entitled to no compensation for losses in value prior to the formal 
151. One recent estimate suggests that urban renewal projects take from five to ten 
years to complete, although the pace of completion has been quickening. The size of 
the project, difficulties in marketing, and the ability to keep the many private and 
public groups involved in the project on schedule are important factors affecting the 
time required for completion. J. KAUFJIIAN, URBAN RENEWAL, IN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
OF URBAN PLANNING 486, 499 (1968). 
152. For discussion of the relocation requirement in urban renewal, see Berger &: 
Cogen, Responsive Urban Renewal: The Neighborhood Shapes the Plan, 1968 URBAN 
L. ANN. 75, 93-96. 
153. Compare State ex rel. Mumma v. Stansberry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 191, 214 N.E.2d 
684 (1964) (holding a prohibition on repairs unconstitutional); with Hunter v. Adams, 
180 Cal. App. 2d 511, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1960). 
672 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:635 
taking, or he will always be able to claim that he is entitled to 
recoupment of intermediate losses. 
Public agencies will argue for the first position-that the 
property owner is entitled to no compensation for intermediate 
losses. It is well settled that the designation154 of an urban renewal 
project area-or even the institution of condemnation proceedings11111 
-does not in itself constitute a taking. Under this approach, the 
property to be acquired will be valued as of the formal taking, which 
will always be subsequent to the period during which the inter-
mediate depreciation in value occurred. These intermediate losses 
will then be ignored. 
To reach the second result, that the condemnee will always be 
compensated for intermediate losses, a court need only begin with 
the well-accepted proposition that an award of compensation can 
neither be increased nor decreased by activities associated with 
the project.156 Or a court may look to the equally well-established 
principle that neither the condemnor nor any other public agency 
may deliberately reduce the value of property to be acquired.m 
This principle was given an extreme application in Housing Author-
154. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939); Danforth v. United States, 
308 U.S. 271 (1939); Thompson v. Fayette County, 302 S."W .2d 550 (Ky. 1957); St. Louis 
Housing Authority v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1964); Hamer v. State Highway 
Commn., 304 S:W.2d 869 (Mo. 1957); Sorbino v. New Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super. 554, 
129 A.2d 473 (1957) (determination of blight held not a taking); City of Houston v. 
Biggers, 380 S.W .2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Glaves, supra note 149, at 329, 342; 
Annot., 64 A.L.R. 546 (1929). See City of Chicago v. Zwick Co., 27 Ill. 2d 128, 188 N.E.2d 
489 (1963); Grisanti v. City of Cleveland, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 143, 179 N.E.2d 798 (1961); 
Valley Forge Golf Club v. Upper Merion Township, 422 Pa. 227, 221 A.2d 292 (1966). 
Typical of these holdings is the decision in State Road Dept. v. Chicone, 158 S.2d 753, 
758 (Fla. 1963), in which the court held that depression or depreciation in value due to 
the "prospect" of condemnation is generally not compensable. For a discussion of 
interim losses in value as they are affected by limitations on the condemnee's oppor-
tunity to challenge the condemner's right to take, see Note, Challenging the Con-
demnor's Right To Condemn: Avoidance of Peripheral Damages, 1967 WASH. U. L.Q. 
436. 
155. Government of the Virgin Islands v. 50.05 Acres of Land, 185 F. Supp. 495 
(D.C.V.I. 1960); Chicago Housing Authority v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 
(1961); State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Beck, 333 Mo. 1118, 63 S.W .2d 814 (1933) (de-
crease in rental value and inability to sell property pending proceedings are "personal" 
damages). Accord, J. SACKMAN, supra note 102, at § 6.13[3]; cf. A. Gettelman Brewing 
Co. v. Milwaukee, 245 Wis. 9, 13 N.W .2d 541 (1944). 
156. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Housing Authority of the City of 
Atlanta v. Hard, 106 Ga. App. 854, 128 S.E.2d 533 (1962): Chicago v. Lederer, 274 III. 
584, 113 N.E. 883 (1916); Commonwealth Dept. of Highways v. Wood, 380 S.W .2d 
73 (Ky. 1964); State v. Carswell, 384 S.W .2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). 
157. United States v. Meadow Brook Club, 259 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1958). For example, 
if an illegal use of a building is caused by the project for which the property is taken, 
no account may be taken of the illegality. Connor v. International & G.N. R.R., 129 
S.W. 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910). Similar are the cases in which the municipality attempts 
to depress the compensation payable in eminent domain by making unjustified changes 
in the zoning which is applicable to the property to be acquired. See Mandclker, 
Planning the Freeway: Interim Controls in Highway Programs, 1964 DUKE L.J. 439. 
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ity of the City of Decatur v. Schroeder.168 Here, rentals decreased 
and vandalism increased after it became known that the property 
was to be taken for a public housing project.159 The court valued 
the property as it existed before the depressing effects of the pro-
posed taking were felt. To push this case to its logical conclusion 
might require that property be valued as of the date a renewal or 
public housing project is designated-presumably the point at which 
a negative impact will first be felt. 
The problem takes on more complicated dimensions if code 
enforcement or demolition activity is undertaken concurrently with 
urban renewal projects. In Research Associates, Inc. v. New Haven 
Redevlopment Agency,160 the New Haven Board of Health refused 
to authorize the repair of two tenement houses and then closed them 
as unfit for habitation. Ordinarily, a building ordered closed may be 
reopened when satisfactory repairs have been made. Nine months 
later, when the redevelopment agency moved to acquire the prop-
erty, the referee in the condemnation proceedings assigned no value 
to the structures. The court affirmed the referee's findings in an 
ambiguous paragraph which relied principally on the action of the 
board of health.161 When noncompensatory police power action has 
been initiated after rather than before the filing of eminent domain 
proceedings, courts have reached contrary results. In one recent 
case162 involving a dwelling demolished under municipal order sub-
sequent to the initiation of eminent domain proceedings, the court 
found that the concurrent exercise of these two powers constituted 
a taking; accordingly, it valued the property as if it had not been 
demolished. The court did not attempt an independent analysis of 
158. 113 Ga. App. 432, 148 S.E.2d 188 (1966). A court can just as convincingly decide 
that incidental damages such as those suffered in Schroeder are noncompensable, as in 
Chicago Housing Authority v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 (1961), and State v. 
Vaughan, 319 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). 
159. The court also relied on the fact that the condemnee's property had been 
posted as government property two months before the actual taking. 113 Ga. App. at 
434, 148 S.E.2d at 190. 
160. 152 Conn. 137, 204 A.2d 833 (1964). Accord, Director of Highways v. Olrich, 
5 Ohio St. 2d 70, 213 N.E.2d 823 (1966). 
161. No rent had been collected on the property since the date of the closing order. 
Cf. Winepol v. State Roads Commn., 220 Md. 227, 151 A.2d 723 (1959). Here the build-
ing's tenants moved out when they learned of the prospective taking, so the property 
was vacant at the time of taking. In using the rent-capitalization approach, the owner 
was allowed to $how potential rental at the time of taking by going back to the last 
years in which rentals were paid. 
162. City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 135, 177 N.E.2d 811 (1961). Cf. 
Shaffer v. City of Atlanta, 223 Ga. 249, 154 S.E.2d 241 (1967). The court found a taking 
in a case in which the city ordered the demolition of a dwelling and then prohibited 
repair of the dwelling pending a final determination of questions pertaining to the 
demolition order. In In re Public Place, 54 Misc. 2d 69, 281 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1967), 
the court found a de facto taking in an improper failure to issue a building permit 
which was followed by a cancellation -of. -condemnee's lease, 
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the demolition order to. determine whether it was justifiable on its 
own merits-an approach which makes more sense than a mechanical 
before-and-after test. 
What of the case in which a property owner voluntarily demol-
ishes his building because of progressive deterioration in an urban 
renewal area or as an alternative to compliance with a repair order? 
In an analogous situation, some courts have recognized that when 
protracted acquisition activity in urban renewal areas leads to 
progressive neighborhood deterioration, vandalism, and property 
abandonment, the resulting losses must be compensated and the 
property valued as if the damage and abandonment had not oc-
curred.163 In one of these cases there was evidence of deliberate acts by 
the condemning authority which contributed to the property loss.164 
But the offending action-notification to public assistance recipients 
in project areas of the need to find dwellings elsewhere-is difficult 
to characterize as other than normal urban renewal project activity. 
The deliberate-act rationale has also been applied to find a taking 
on the basis of normal housing code enforcement activities. In 
City of Detroit v. Cassese,165 public authorities filed an eminent 
domain action for the acquisition of property in an urban renewal 
project area in 1950. The action was left pending for ten years with-
out further action before it was finally dropped. In the interim, one 
of the dwellings to be acquired was vandalized, and the owner final-
ly tore it dmm in response to a city building division order to re-
pair or demolish. The eminent domain action was then refiled.166 
Reversing the case for a new trial under the deliberate-act rationale, 
the appellate court indicated that intense building inspection and 
code enforcement could have constituted a de facto taking prior to 
the refiling of the eminent domain proceeding. The case is per-
163. City of Buffalo v. Strozzi, 54 Misc. 2d 1031, 283 N.Y .S.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1967); City 
of Cleveland v. Cardone, 190 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963); City of Cincinnati v. 
Mandel, 9 Ohio Misc. 235, 224 N.E.2d 179 (C.P. 1966). The courts do not always indicate 
whether they base their decisions on a constructive taking or on the recognition of 
additional compensable elements of damage. See Becos v. Mosheter, 15 Ohio St, 2d 15, 
238 N.E.2d 548 (1968). 
164. City of Cleveland v. Cardone, 190 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963). 
165. 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965). In a similar case arising out of the same 
project, a federal court reached the same result. Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 
655 (E.D. Mich. 1966). In this case the city also demanded from the owner a waiver of 
any claim of damages for the increased value of his property due to improvements which 
the city had allowed. Cassese was also followed in Sayre v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 
175 (N.D. Ohio 1967). In Sayre, the court noted that no taking would have occurred if a 
depreciation in property values in the project area had taken place, even though there 
had been no delay in the urban renewal eminent domain proceedings. 
166. Note that abandonment and refiling of the compensation proceeding will not 
entitle the property owner to compensation for intermediate damage if he cannot 
establish the bad faith of the condemnor. City of Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W .2d 700 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964). 
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haps explainable by its unusual facts: formal eminent domain pro-
ceedings were filed and left pending for a ten-year interim period 
during which code enforcement activity was carried on.167 In an-
other case, a trial court in Ohio found that systematic building 
demolition activities carried out pursuant to a federal grant were 
not a substitute for a taking and payment of compensation in emi-
nent domain.168 In this case, the buildings to be demolished were in 
an area which was scheduled for later urban renewal treatment. 
Evaluation of these recent precedents is difficult. On the one 
hand, they suggest a cautious approach to any use of building de-
molition or code enforcement activity in conjunction with urban 
renewal programs that require payment of compensation. On the 
other hand they reflect, to some extent, the current practice of per-
mitting the use of noncompensatory housing code enforcement and 
building demolition activity to depress the level of compensation 
that is constitutionally payable in an eminent domain proceeding. 
Under the compensation method proposed in this Article, hous-
ing maintenance standards are explicitly applied to determine con-
stitutionally acceptable compensation levels. Only a timing problem 
remains. Public agencies must be careful to consider the negative 
impact of urban renewal and related activities on the property sub-
ject to valuation during the interim between announcement of the 
project and the actual taking. One way in which to accomplish this 
is to make blanket valuations of property in urban renewal areas as 
soon as the projects are designated.169 
C. The Personal Hardship Problem 
The proposal made in this Article to base compensation for 
167. Cf. A. Gettelman Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 245 Wis. 9, 13 N.W.2d 
541 (1944), in which the court held that damages were not payable for delay in starting 
condemnation proceedings that had been kept under consideration for some time. Even 
mere delay in continuing eminent domain proceedings may result in compensation 
being payable for depreciation in property values when the delay is unreasonable. See 
Lord Calvert Theatre v. Mayor &: City Council, 208 Md. 606, 119 A.2d 415 (1956). 
168. State ex rel. Shulman v. City of Cleveland, 8 Ohio Misc. 1, 220 N.E.2d 386 (C.P. 
1966). In West Chicago Park Commrs. v. Boal, 232 Ill. 238, 83 N.E. 824 (1908), the court 
affirmed an award based on the rent-capitalization method of valuation when witnesses 
for the condemnor based their estimate in part on the expectation that condemnation 
of the building for insanitary conditions would depress rents. 
169. Discounting the impact of local housing improvement programs over time may 
still present difficult problems, however. For one thing, the impact of these programs is 
cumulative, so that earlier projects may have an influence on areas of the city which 
are scheduled for later redevelopment. In addition, even the mere announcement of 
proposed housing improvement activities may have an effect on maintenance and 
investment. But this is difficult to take into account until some official act occurs which 
can be used as a point in time for the beginning of the project. A line must be drawn 
somewhere. The answer may be that the property owner will have to assume the 
collateral effects of housing improvement activities in other parts of the city on the 
ground that their effect on property values in later projects is too remote. 
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slum properties on compliance with the standards of housing main-
tenance codes is intended as a method of rationalizing public powers 
over slum housing rather than as a punitive measure against 
investors in slum properties. For one thing, some of these investors 
may be poor Negroes or Caucasians170 rather than the slumlords who 
are the targets of social reformers. Nevertheless, we can expect that 
using housing code standards to determine the amount of compen-
sation will in many cases reduce below present levels the compen-
sation that is payable. While we might agree that these losses should 
be forced on slum investors as a matter of social policy, more diffi-
cult problems are presented by the owner-occupant who must seek 
new housing elsewhere in the community if his home is taken for an 
urban renewal project. Considerable evidence already exists that 
owner-occupants displaced by urban renewal activities do not re-
ceive sufficient compensation to purchase adequate replacement 
housing.171 In these cases, the law of compensation conflicts with 
equally demanding policies calling for the proper relocation of resi-
dents displaced by public action. The problem is complicated by 
the fact that the market for land-financing in slum areas inflates 
property security on slum housing in order to enhance the at-
tractiveness of the lending risk. Even an award of compensation un-
der conventional rules of valuation may leave the owner-occupant 
with an amount which is insufficient to retire existing indebted-
ness, much less compensate him for his equity investment.172 Various 
solutions to this problem have been suggested. Under one, a whole-
sale-retail approach to market value,173 the property mvner would 
receive the fair credit value of his property rather than the fair 
cash value. The award would apparently be sufficient to retire any 
existing indebtedness, but not enough to compensate the owner 
for his investment or for improvements. Another solution would 
authorize the condemning agency to acquire the notes or other 
evidence of indebtedness as well as the property itself, again at 
market value.174 Existing indebtedness would be acquired at its fair 
170. See G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 121-51 (1966). 
171. See the discussion in Downs, Uncompensated Non-Construction Costs Which 
Urban Highways and Urban Renewal Impose Upon Residential Households, in Hear-
ings on Urban Highway Planning, Location, and Design Before the Subcomm. on Roads 
of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 3Ill, 323-27 (1968). 
172. The problem was dramatically illustrated by the Mayme Riley litigation. Riley 
v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 246 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
For comment see HousE COMM. ON Ptmuc WORKS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., STUDY OF COM· 
PENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION JN 
FEDERALLY AssISTED PROGRAMS 86-88 (1965); Dunham, Do "Hard Cases" Make Bad 
Economics?, 4 How. L.J. 50 (1958). 
173. HOUSE CoMM, ON PUBLIC WORKS, supra note 17.2, at 86. 
174, Id, at 87, 
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market value rather than its face value, and any difference between 
the value of the property and the fair market value of the indebted-
ness would be payable to the owner. A final alternative, which has 
been adopted in England, would authorize judicial write-off or 
alteration of the terms and period of an outstanding indebtedness 
in cases in which the property is not acquired at a value sufficient 
to retire existing debt.175 Although attractive, a statute drafted along 
this line might run into constitutional difficulties in the United 
States. 
While none of these proposals has been implemented, some re-
lief has been made available to the displaced ovmer-occupant by 
recent federal and state legislation which provides him a compen-
satory bonus to obtain replacement housing which meets minimum 
standards.176 These innovations are helpful, but they leave un-
touched the plight of the low-income investor in rental housing who 
does not happen to reside in the housing he o-wns. Unless we wish 
to make socially significant policy distinctions between the owner-
occupant and the owner-investor, the personal hardship problem 
must receive continuing attention. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
No attempt has ever been made to rationalize the exercise of 
compensatory and noncompensatory public powers over slum prop-
erty. Disparities in the incidence of compliance burdens on slum 
property owners, difficulties in finding appropriate levels of com-
pensation, and corresponding rigidities in the exercise of public 
powers of housing improvement suggest that a way of rationalizing 
the exercise of these powers must be found.177 These problems will 
intensify with increasing opportunity for the overlapping exercise 
175. Housing Act of 1957, 5 &: 6 Eliz. 2, c. 56, sched. 2, pt. 2, par. 5, as extended 
by the Housing (Slum Clearance Compensation) Act 1965, c. 81, § 2. 
176. A $5,000 bonus is provided in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 
1968, 82 Stat. 476, § 516, and in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 815, § 30. 
For a similar provision in a state law see MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 6A (Supp. 1968). As 
the federal legislation is written, the bonus is payable regardless of the physical condi-
tion of the property that is acquired. 
177. This Article has concentrated on slum housing and on housing improvement 
programs, but there is no reason why the proposals made here cannot be applied to 
takings of slum housing for nonhousing purposes, such as highway programs. Moreover, 
as standards of maintenance for nonresidential property are more widely adopted, these 
proposals can also be implemented for nonresidential property. A question may be 
raised whether valuation on the basis of maintenance codes might not supplant the 
market-value standard in all cases. One answer is that the market test should continue 
to be applied whenever the market is operating under normal conditions. Whether the 
market-value or the maintenance-code test of value should be applied will probably 
be a question for judicial or administrative determination. In addition, further analysis 
may indicate a gradual erosion of the market-value standard outside slum areas. 
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of public powers based alternatively on the payment of compensa-
tion in full, or the payment of no compensation at all. 
This Article has attempted to construct a new basis for com-
pensation which will apply regardless of the housing treatment that 
is selected. Approaches to this problem which start with the market-
value basis of just compensation make the assumption that the 
market-value standard can be made to work in slum areas. Our anal-
ysis began, instead, with the law of building demolition. The as-
sumption was that the principles governing the demolition of sub-
standard housing without compensation might provide a clue to a 
constitutional definition of value in slum housing. This analysis, 
however, led to a consideration of standards of repair. The courts 
have tended to judge an order for the demolition of a building 
on the basis of a comparison of required repairs with building 
value. But the use of "building value" as a basis for judging the 
repair burden assumes the question in issue. 
As an alternative, we examined the housing maintenance code as 
the public expression of minimum housing standards and proposed 
a method of deriving the value of a substandard building from that 
code. This analysis began with a consideration of constitutionally 
acceptable standards of housing maintenance. From these we devel-
oped an index of building value based on the extent to which the 
building complies with the maintenance requirements. Compensa-
tion would be predicated on the extent of compliance, with two 
exceptions. A tipping point would be selected beyond which the 
existing building would be assumed to contribute no value to the 
reconstructed building. In these cases, the owner would not be 
constitutionally entitled to compensation. Furthermore, the burden 
of housing repair orders would be judged constitutionally on the 
basis of the owner's opportunity to recoup his repair costs from 
future rentals. 
The proposal does not necessarily provide a satisfactory resolu-
tion of all the problems discussed. Constitutional difficulties may 
arise from the use of housing maintenance standards to fix levels of 
compensation, and hardship may result whenever compensation is 
inadequate to retire existing indebtedness or to secure adequate re-
placement housing. Solutions to these problems are possible. If they 
can be found, the proposal put forward here can make a significant 
contribution rationalizing the exercise of legal powers over slum 
housing. 
